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Article
COLLATERAL REMEDIES IN CRIMINAL CASES IN MARYLAND:
AN ASSESSMENT
MICHAEL A. MILLEMANN*
I. INTRODUCTION
In this Article, I describe and evaluate the major collateral reme-
dies in Maryland that are available to prisoners to challenge unlawful
convictions and sentences: the writ of habeas corpus,' a motion to
correct an illegal sentence,2 and a postconviction proceeding.3 By
"collateral," I mean the process that begins upon completion of direct
review.4 The state's Uniform Postconviction Procedure Act (PCPA)
provides the primary remedy.5 Additional remedies include proceed-
ings based on newly discovered evidence6 and on DNA evidence,
7
and, for persons who are not in or under custody, the writ of error
coram nobis.s
The collateral process is a vital part of our criminal justice system.
When important facts exist outside the trial record, the collateral pro-
* Jacob A. France Professor of Public Interest Law, University of Maryland School of
Law. I would like to thank Phil Pierson for his research and editorial assistance, and Ted
Tomlinson and Richard Boldt for their very helpful editorial comments.
1. See infra Part III.A.
2. See infra Part III.B.
3. See infta Part III.C.
4. See generally I DONALD E. WILKES, JR., STATE POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES AND RELIEF
§ 1-5, at 18 (2001). Wilkes refers to this process as the "postconviction" process. I use the
word "collateral" to avoid confusion. In Maryland, there is a "postconviction" process, but
it is but one of several collateral remedies. Wilkes notes that recently "there have been
some inroads on the principle that postconviction proceedings are to be postponed until
after the direct review proceedings are completed or unavailable." Id. Wilkes cites Texas
as an example, where, in death penalty cases, postconviction habeas corpus cases "run
concurrently" with direct appeals. Id.; see 2 WILKEs, supra, app. A at 640 (citing James C.
Harrington & Anne More Burnham, Texas's New Habeas Corpus Procedure for Death-Row In-
mates: KaJkaesque--and Probably Unconstitutional, 27 ST. MARY'S L.J.69, 89-90 (1995)). Texas
law requires any application for a writ of habeas corpus to be filed within 180 days of the
appointment of counsel by the convicting court or within 45 days of the date the state's
brief is filed with the court of criminal appeals. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
11.071(4) (a) (Vernon 2005).
5. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. §§ 7-101 to -301 (2004). See generally Edward A. Tom-
linson, Post-Conviction in Maryland: Past, Present and Future, 45 MD. L. REv. 927, 934 (1986).
6. See infra Part IV.C.2.a.
7. See infta Part IV.C.2.a.
8. See infta note 85.
2005] COLLATERAL REMEDIES IN CRIMINAL CASES IN MARYLAND 969
cess is usually the sole means by which a convicted person can enforce
fundamental fair-trial rights, for example, to the effective assistance of
counsel,9 to obtain exculpatory evidence,1° and to ajury trial (absent a
knowing and intelligent waiver). 1
I begin, however, by describing the substantial federal disengage-
ment in this area, which enhances the importance of the state's collat-
eral remedies. The retrenchment in federal habeas corpus in the last
fifteen years has been extraordinary.12 At the direction of Congress
and the United States Supreme Court, the federal judiciary now plays
an extremely limited role in protecting the federal constitutional
rights of state prisoners.1" Today, it is the state's courts to which a
person who is wrongfully convicted in Maryland must primarily look
for relief, not only as a first resort, but often effectively as the last
resort. It is good, therefore, that Maryland's system of collateral reme-
dies is strong and comprehensive in many respects.
The General Assembly has rejected proposals to import restrictive
provisions of federal law into the state's postconviction statute,14 per-
9. Johnson v. State, 292 Md. 405, 434-35, 439 A.2d 542, 559 (1982). But see In re Parris
W., 363 Md. 717, 726, 770 A.2d 202, 207 (2001) (noting that although the "general rule
[is] that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is raised most appropriately in a post-
conviction proceeding... [, this rule) is not absolute and, where the critical facts are not
in dispute and the record is sufficiently developed to permit a fair evaluation of the claim,
there is no need for a collateral fact-finding proceeding, and review on direct appeal may
be appropriate and desirable" (citing Harris v. State, 299 Md. 511, 517, 474 A.2d 890, 893
(1984))).
10. Conyers v. State, 367 Md. 571, 595, 790 A.2d 15, 29 (2002) (holding that a postcon-
viction hearing is the appropriate venue to challenge a violation of a defendant's right to
obtain exculpatory evidence if he had no way of knowing about the evidence sooner);
accord Wilson v. State, 363 Md. 333, 768 A.2d 675 (2001).
11. Smith v. Director, Patuxent Inst., 13 Md. App. 53, 280 A.2d 910 (1971) (granting,
in a postconviction proceeding, an applicant's challenge to the waiver of right to a trial by
jury).
12. See infra Part II.B.
13. The most dramatic action of Congress was its enactment of the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of the United States Code). See generally 2 RANDY HERTZ &
JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE app. a (4th ed. 2001)
(providing a detailed account of AEDPA amendments of Title 28 of the United States
Code). Before 1996, however, the Supreme Court had restricted the use of federal habeas
corpus in a series of decisions. See infra Part II.B.
14. For example, see Act of May 24, 1991, ch. 499, 1991 Md. Laws 2992, 2992-99, in
which the General Assembly rejected proposed amendments to Article 27, § 645A. These
amendments, inter alia, would have:
(1) Barred, with narrow exceptions, any retroactive application of new rules in post-
conviction proceedings. Id. at 2997 (This is the federal habeas rule initially established in
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).)
(2) Reversed the current waiver rule for claims based on "fundamental" rights with the
easier-to-satisfy federal habeas waiver rule. 1991 Md. Laws at 2996-97; see also Coleman v.
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haps in recognition that the federal retrenchment calls for exactly the
opposite: an invigorated state check on the federal process.1 5
Maryland's judiciary has maintained a balance among the various
collateral remedies and used them especially to enforce the right to
the effective assistance of counsel (the predicate to a fair trial),16 and
a group of rights deemed "fundamental" for purposes of the PCPA."7
Maryland's current Governor has reestablished the time-honored
policy of considering for parole and clemency prisoners who have
been sentenced to life with parole, at least in a limited way.1" This is
an important part of the state's criminal justice system.
I believe there is a problem, however, that Maryland's appellate
courts can address within the framework of the existing PCPA. It is
the overuse of the "waiver" doctrine in circumstances in which the
policies that support the doctrine do not apply. Maryland's courts,
like most others, rarely resolve postconviction claims on the merits,
usually finding that the petitioner's lawyer waived the claim by failing
to preserve the error at trial, on appeal, or in an initial postconviction
proceeding. What I find extremely troubling is that the substantial
majority of these attorney "waivers" are inadvertent; most are the
product of negligence, but not the gross negligence which, when cou-
pled with prejudice, qualifies as actionable "ineffective assistance of
counsel."'" They do not reflect conscious strategic judgments or, for
that fact, any judgment at all. In these many cases, we accept attorney
negligence as a basis to sustain convictions, lengthy incarceration, and
even state-imposed executions.
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991) (requiring a petitioner to show "cause for the default
and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation [of law that the petitioner wishes to
assert]"). The current rule is that the claim is not waived unless the petitioner personally
and "intelligently and knowingly" fails to assert the claim and could have asserted the
claim, in an earlier proceeding. See infra Part III.C.l.h.
(3) Created a 3-year statute of limitations for noncapital postconviction claims and a
180-day period for capital claims. 1991 Md. Laws at 2995; see also infra Part III.C.l.d.
15. See infra Part II.D.
16. See infra note 234.
17. See infra Part III.C.1.h(1) (waiver limited to fundamental rights).
18. See Lomax v. Warden, 356 Md. 569, 573, 741 A.2d 476, 478 (1999) (describing the
decision of former Governor Paris Glendening to generally stop considering for parole
prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment). Governor Robert Ehrlich has reinstated the
traditional policy of Maryland Governors to use the commutation, clemency, and parole-
approval powers to mitigate punishment where warranted. As of March 1, 2005, he had
granted commutations to, or approved parole for, four life-sentenced prisoners and three
prisoners sentenced to twenty-five years without parole. This information was provided to
the author by Chrysovalantis Kefalas, Deputy Counsel to Governor Robert L. Ehrlich, Jr.
19. See infra note 234.
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Clearly, the waiver rules are supported by state interests in finality
and judicial economy, and sometimes by fairness to victims and their
families. However, the reflexive invocation of these rules when they
do not serve the underlying policies gives our criminal justice system
the quality of a lottery by too often basing the ultimate determination
of who goes free and who goes to prison not on defendants' relative
culpability, but rather on the quality of their lawyers.
Although revisions in the waiver rules cannot wholly resolve this
structural problem, they can address it in important ways. There is a
now-dormant provision of the PCPA that excuses waiver when the pe-
titioner can demonstrate that "special circumstances" justify excuse. 20
I argue that Maryland's courts ought to use this provision, as the Gen-
eral Assembly intended, to excuse waivers. I offer two limited exam-
ples: (1) when the failure to make an argument was due to a
reasonably unforeseeable interpretation of law,2' and (2) in extraordi-
nary cases, when the petitioner makes an adequate showing of factual
innocence.2 2 I do not mean, however, to suggest that these are the
only potential uses of the "special circumstances" exception. Rather,
the test is an equitable, context-specific one that should be satisfied
when the policies underlying waiver do not apply.
I address two other issues under the PCPA: (1) whether it entitles
litigants to conduct discovery (although this is a novel issue, I believe
the PCPA authorizes courts, in their discretion, to order limited dis-
covery, including depositions) ;23 and (2) the meaning of the "interests
of justice" standard that governs a court's decision whether to reopen
a postconviction proceeding (its text, legislative history, and the chief
decision interpreting it give it a broad, open-ended meaning).24
The judicial role in collateral cases is a difficult one. Many cases
involve successive petitions, and in most of these cases, the petitioners
proceed pro se. It is sometimes impossible to understand arguments
and to determine whether the petitioner has previously presented
them to a court. If there are appendices, they are often unorganized
and unintelligible. In cases in which the convictions are old-some-
times two or three decades old-the basic records may be unavaila-
ble. 25 This, itself, is a serious problem that needs to be addressed.2 6
20. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 7-106(b)(1)(ii) (2004).
21. See infra Part IV.C.2.b.
22. See infra Part IV.C.2.a.
23. See infra Part IV.A.
24. See infra Part LV.B.
25. E.g., Bauerlien v. Warden, 236 Md. 346, 348, 203 A.2d 880, 881 (1964) (noting that
a postconviction petitioner was unable to get a copy of the trial transcript because "in the
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In any event, the larger number of meritless claims in collateral pro-
ceedings, including initial postconviction proceedings, can threaten
to obscure the meritorious ones.
The goal, of course, is to find the balance among interests in fi-
nality, judicial economy, fairness (to both the petitioner and the
state), and equal enforcement of the law. Although these interests are
usually described as ",competing," in the most basic sense they are con-
sistent. Both the state (on behalf of the people it represents) and the
convicted defendant have a deep common interest in remedying a
wrongful conviction. Many years ago, the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land made this point in reaffirming that every judge in Maryland, act-
ing as a "conservator of the peace," has the power to issue the writ of
habeas corpus.27 This is because "every case of unlawful imprison-
ment is a violation of the peace of the State, as well as of the right of
the citizen." 28
II. THE INCREASED IMPORTANCE OF STATE COLLATERAL REMEDIES
A. The Development of a Strong Federal Role in the Protection of the
Rights of Criminal Defendants Before and After Conviction
During the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s, the Supreme Court began to
recognize new constitutional rights of state criminal defendants that
applied against the states.29 Although the Court eventually assumed a
strong role in defining and protecting the rights of criminal defend-
ants, its initial steps, taken as part of the "incorporation" debate, were
tentative.30 By the late 1950s and early 1960s, however, the federal
seven years since the trial . . . the reporter's notes have been lost or destroyed and the
dialogue of the trial cannot be recreated").
26. The Maryland Administrative Office of the Courts has asked a committee to ex-
amine the state's record-retention practices and policies. At a minimum, the central
records in a convicted defendant's criminal case should be retained and stored during the
period of that person's life. This would be a substantial change in the current practices,
under which key records are destroyed after twelve years, and transcription notes after
seven years.
27. In re Glenn, 54 Md. 572, 596 (1880) (holding unconstitutional a state law that lim-
itedjudges' jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus to the circuit in which the court sat,
because Maryland's Constitution requires that jurisdiction be "co-extensive with the limits
of the State").
28. Id.
29. See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (invalidating a criminal
conviction based upon evidence obtained by pumping the defendant's stomach because
that method is "too close to the rack and the screw to permit of constitutional differentia-
tion"); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932) (recognizing a constitutional right to
effective counsel in capital cases, applicable against the states).
30. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) (rejecting the argument that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated, and made applicable against
[VOL. 64:968
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decisions 1 were motivating states, including Maryland, to make sub-
stantial changes in the remedies they provided to convicted defend-
ants after direct appeal in order to keep pace with the Supreme
Court.
3 2
During the 1960s and 1970s, the Supreme Court expanded the
federal role in protecting the pretrial, trial, and postconviction rights
of defendants in criminal cases. The Court rendered a series of deci-
sions, some on direct appeal 33 and others in federal habeas corpus
cases,34 which revolutionized criminal procedure.
As the Supreme Court expanded the rights of criminal defend-
ants, it thereby increased the types of claims that state prisoners could
raise by federal habeas corpus. There are differing views about when
the Supreme Court and Congress determined that the scope of fed-
eral habeas corpus should encompass all federal constitutional
the states, the Fifth Amendment's double jeopardy guarantee absent a "hardship so acute
and shocking that our polity will not endure it"); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 50-51
(1947) (rejecting the argument that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment incorporated, and made applicable against the states, the Fifth Amendment's privi-
lege against self-incrimination). But see Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (holding the
Fifth Amendment to be applicable against the states); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609
(1965) (holding that the Fifth Amendment, applicable to both the federal government
and the states, prohibits commentary by the prosecution or the court on the defendant's
silence); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 796 (1969) (overturning Palko).
31. See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (holding unconstitutional the
denial of counsel on appeal to convicted indigent defendants); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S.
12 (1956) (holding that an indigent appellant is constitutionally entitled to a free copy of
the trial transcript); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953) (considering on habeas review not
only procedural questions, but also the merits of constitutional claims).
32. See infra Part III.A.
33. E.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (holding that the Sixth Amend-
ment, as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment, required states to provide jury trials
to criminal defendants when the federal government would be obligated to do so); Klopfer
v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (holding that the defendant was denied the right to
a speedy trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, as incorporated by the Fourteenth
Amendment); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that the Fifth Amend-
ment, as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibited the state from introduc-
ing statements made by defendants during custodial interrogation without specified
warnings).
34. E.g., Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28 (1978) (holding that the federal rule that jeopardy
attached when a jury was sworn and empanelled was an integral part of the constitutional
guarantee against double jeopardy and therefore applied against the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment); Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220 (1977) (holding that the Sixth
Amendment, as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibited introduction of
evidence of identification obtained after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal pro-
ceedings and in the absence of counsel); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (hold-
ing that the Sixth Amendment, as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment, required
appointment of counsel for indigent defendants in any prosecution for a crime punishable
by imprisonment).
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claims.35 However, there seems to be a consensus that by 1953, after
the Court decided Brown v. Allen,36 this was the rule.3 v
B. The Federal Retrenchment
In the 1980s and 1990s, the Supreme Court and Congress re-
versed field by significantly restricting the extent to which state prison-
ers could use federal habeas corpus to challenge unconstitutional
convictions and sentences.38
35. Compare Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State
Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 463-99 (1963) (tracing the development of federal habeas
law and arguing that the principle that a final decision rendered by a competent state
tribunal could be revisited in a federal habeas proceeding did not exist before the Court's
1953 decision in Brown v. Allen), with Gary Peller, In Defense of Federal Habeas Corpus Relitiga-
tion, 16 I-IARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 579, 610-63 (1982) (arguing that prisoners historically
could use federal habeas corpus to assert due process rights). Hertz and Liebman urge a
third view: historically, the scope of federal habeas has included "claims of particular na-
tional importance," including "recognized constitutional claims." 1 HERTZ & LIEBMAN,
supra note 13, at 3940.
36. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
37. See I HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 13, at 67-69; Bator, supra note 35, at 463; Peller,
supra note 35, at 583. In 1976, the Supreme Court held thatfederal habeas petitioners
could not assert claims based on the exclusionary rule for violations of the Fourth Amend-
ment that was conceived in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465 (1976). The Court noted that because it characterized that rule as "a judicially created
remedy rather than a personal constitutional right," unlike rights clearly granted by the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments, its decision was "not concerned with the scope of the habeas
corpus statute as authority for litigating constitutional claims." Id. at 495 n.37.
38. The Supreme Court, for example, ruled that, with limited exceptions, federal
courts could not apply "new rules," defined expansively, in federal habeas corpus proceed-
ings. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (overruling Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618
(1965)). Further, the Court strictly defined and enforced procedural default rules. See,
e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991) (holding that a lawyer's three-day
late filing of an appeal from a state habeas decision waived his client's right to assert state
habeas claims in a federal habeas proceeding since the client could not "demonstrate
cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law,
or demonstrate that failure to consider the claims [would] result in a fundamental miscar-
riage of justice"). The Court also held during this time period that federal habeas peti-
tions containing multiple claims, some exhausted and some procedurally valid, must be
dismissed. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982). For a discussion of Supreme Court deci-
sions curtailing the use of federal habeas in the 1980s, see FrankJ. Remington, State Pris-
oner Use of Federal Habeas Corpus Procedures: State Prisoner Access to Postconviction Relief--A
Lessening Role for Federal Courts; An Increasingly Important Role for State Courts, 44 OHIO ST. L.J.
287 (1983).
In recent years, however, the Supreme Court, acting on direct review, has recognized
important constitutional rights of criminal defendants, especially in capital cases. See, e.g.,
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (holding that Arizona's capital punishment statute
violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial where a judge, without
involvement of ajury, was authorized to make a factual determination about the existence
of aggravating evidence for the purpose of imposing a stricter sentence); Atkins v. Virginia,
536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding that the execution of a mentally retarded defendant is an
974
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In 1996, Congress consolidated and expanded these restrictions
by enacting the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(AEDPA). In summary form, these amendments to the federal
habeas corpus statute: (1) impose a one-year statute of limitations for
the filing of habeas corpus petitions in noncapital cases4 ° and 180 days
in capital cases;41 (2) require federal courts to give substantial defer-
ence to factual findings of state courts, assuming certain conditions
are satisfied;42 (3) require federal judges to accept substantive deci-
sions of state judges that are fairly adjudicated and explained even if
those decisions are incorrect, as long as they are not "contrary to...
clearly established [Supreme Court] law" and are not "an unreasona-
ble application of [Supreme Court] law;"4" (4) prohibit federal judges
from applying any rules other than ones that, due to retroactive appli-
cation, were in effect at the time of the highest state court decision in
order to support the development of a factual claim not considered in
the state court proceeding;44 and (5) generally prohibit federal judges
from deciding the merits of a claim when the petitioner, usually
through counsel, violates a state procedural rule (for example, by fail-
ing to make a timely objection) and the petitioner cannot demon-
strate "cause" for the default and "prejudice" therefrom.45 Some of
these rules codified rules from Supreme Court decisions, while others
are more restrictive than prior Supreme Court decisions.
The result of these amendments is that federal habeas relief is
generally available only to correct an egregious misapplication of a
narrowly defined and clearly established Supreme Court ruling that
was in effect at the time of the state court decision (no matter what
the rules may be at the time of the habeas proceeding). Even then, it
is only available if the petitioner's prior lawyers preserved the argu-
ment, the petitioner is confined in a federal circuit that will reasona-
"excessive" punishment under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth
Amendment).
39. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
40. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2000).
41. Id. § 2263(a).
42. Id. § 2254(e).
43. Idt.§ 2254(d).
44. Id. § 2254(e) (2).
45. Id. §§ 2244(b), 2254. There are narrow exceptions to this two-part requirement,
including a showing of actual innocence. See infra Part IV.C.2.a. The result of the AEDPA
and the earlier Supreme Court decisions is that "[flederal habeas litigation is now over-
whelmingly concerned with the procedural posture of an inmate's constitutional claims
rather than with the merits of those claims." Jordan Steiker, Restructuring Post-Conviction
Review of Federal Constitutional Claims Raised by State Prisoners: Confronting the New Face of
Excessive Proceduralism, 1998 U. CHi. LEGAL F. 315, 317.
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bly apply the habeas rules, and the petition is filed within the
deadline. For many prisoners, this last requirement, by itself, may be
prohibitive due to the delays in state postconviction litigation. Be-
cause of the sheer volume of state noncapital postconviction cases, the
time it takes to investigate and prepare the state petition, and the re-
sulting delay in providing counsel to state inmates, there is a real risk
that the one-year statute of limitations for filing the federal habeas
petition will run in a number of cases before the inmate's lawyer can
file the state petition.
The result of these factors is that the federal habeas corpus check
on state court interpretations of the United States Constitution has
been effectively eliminated in most cases.
C. The Reduced Use of the State Clemency Power
The state judicial responsibility is enhanced by another factor,
the substantially reduced use of executive clemency as a last-resort
remedy for wrongful convictions and unnecessary incarceration.46
Clemency is a plenary, discretionary executive power.4 7 Some states
vest this power solely in the governor.4 8 Some vest the power in an
independent board.49 Others provide for a shared clemency power,
between the governor and others.5 ° Many states, including Maryland,
46. I use the term "clemency" generically to include unconditional pardons, condi-
tional pardons, commutations of sentences, stays of execution and reprieves, and any other
type of executive relief from criminal convictions or sentences. The use of clemency has
been the subject of much scholarship. See generally Hugo Adam Bedau, The Decline of Execu-
tive Clemency in Capital Cases, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 255 (1990-91); Alyson Dins-
more, Clemency in Capital Cases: The Need to Ensure Meaningful Review, 49 UClA L. REv. 1825
(2002); Clifford Dorne & Kenneth Gewerth, Mercy in a Climate of Retributive Justice: Interpreta-
tions from a National Survey of Executive Clemency Procedures, 25 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIv.
CONFINEMENT 413 (1999); Adam M. Gershowitz, The Diffusion of Responsibility in Capital
Clemency, 17J.L. & POL. 669 (2001); Daniel T. Kobil, How to Grant Clemency in Unforgiving
Times, 31 CAP. U. L. REv. 219 (2003); Victoria J. Palacios, Faith in Fantasy: The Supreme
Court's Reliance on Commutation to Ensure Justice in Death Penalty Cases, 49 VAND. L. REv. 311(1996); Michael L. Radelet & Barbara A. Zsembik, Executive Clemency in Post-Furman Cases,
27 U. RICH. L. REv. 289 (1993).
47. See, e.g., Bedau, supra note 46, at 257 (describing clemency decisions as "standard-
less in procedure, discretionary in exercise, and unreviewable in result").
48. See IDAHO CONST. art. IV, § 7; COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-17-101 to -102 (West
2004); N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 15 (McKinney 2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 147-21 (2004); R.I. GEN.
LAWS §§ 13-10-1 to -2 (2002); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 809 (2000); W.VA. CODE ANN. § 5-1-16
(Michie 2002); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 7-13-801 (2003).
49. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-130a (West 2005) (formerly § 18-26); GA. CODE
ANN. § 42-942 (2005); S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-21-1000 (Supp. 2004); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-
27-5 (2003).
50. See Apaz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 31402 (West Supp. 2004); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 940.01
(West Supp. 2005); 71 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 299 (West Supp. 2004); TEX. CODE CRaM.
[VOL. 64:968
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vest the power in the governor, but authorize a board or agency to
conduct investigations and make recommendations to the governor. 1
Other states have hybrids of these approaches.52
Although there is data showing a substantial decrease in the use
of the federal clemency power by the President,53 state data is not
PROC. ANN. art. 48.01 (Vernon Supp. 2004-05); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.885 ann.
(West 2003).
51. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 4361-4364 (2005); HAWAn REV. STAT. ANN. § 353-72
(Michie 2004); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/3-3-13 (West 1997); IND. CODE ANN. § 11-9-2-2
(Michie 2003); IowA CODE ANN. §§ 914.1-.7 (West 2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3701 (Supp.
2004); Ky. CONST. § 77; Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 439.450 (Banks-Baldwin 2004); ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 2161-2164 (West 2003); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. §§ 7-206(3), 7-
601 (2004); MAss. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 127, §§ 152, 154 (West 2002); MICH. CONST. art. V,
§ 14; MICH. COMp. LAWs ANN. §§ 791.243-.244 (West 2004); Miss. CONST. art. V, § 124;
Miss. CODE ANN. § 47-7-31 (2004); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 217.800 (2004); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 4:21-:25 (2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:167-4 (2005); N.M. CONsT. art. V, § 6; N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 31-21-17 (Michie 2000); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12-55.1-02, -04 (2003); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2967.02 (2005); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, §§ 332, 332.2 (West 2004); S.D.
CODIFIED LAws § 24-14-1 (Michie 1998); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-27-101, -28-126 (2003); VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 53.1-229 to -231 (2002); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 304.08 (West 2005); see also Act to
Amend Provisions Concerning Clemency Procedures, 2005 ARK. Acrs 1975, sec. 3, § 16-93-
204.
52. See ALA. CODE § 15-22-36(a) (2004) (the primary authority to grant pardons rests
with the Board of Pardons and Parole, with the exception that only the governor has the
authority to commute death sentences); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 4800-4801 (West 2000 &
Supp. 2005) (the Board of Prison Terms may "report" cases to the governor for considera-
tion); CAL. CONsT. art. V, § 8 (the governor has clemency power, although in cases in
which a prisoner has been convicted of two or more felonies in separate proceedings, a
majority vote by the California Supreme Court is required to grant clemency); LA. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 15:572 (West 2005) (the governor has power to grant a reprieve, but approval
of the Board of Pardons is needed for a full pardon, and a first-time offender is automati-
cally pardoned after completion of his sentence); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 638.01 (West 2003)
(the governor is one of three members of a Board of Pardons that has clemency power);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-23-301 (2004) (the governor makes the final clemency decision,
however, in noncapital cases, there must first be a positive "recommendation" from the
Parole Board); NEB. CONST. art. IV, § 13 (the governor is one of three members of the
Board of Pardons, which has clemency power); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. 213.010 (Michie
2004) (the governor is one member of the Board of Pardons, which also includes justices
of the state supreme court and the attorney general); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 137.225, 144.649
(2003) (the governor has clemency power, although in a limited number of cases, a court
may "set aside" a conviction after a sentence is served).
53. On the federal level, the power to grant clemency is vested in the President. Article
II, § 2 of the United States Constitution states: "The President . . . shall have Power to
grant Reprieves and Pardons.... ." During the past three decades, executive clemency has
been granted with decreasing frequency. Between the administrations of Calvin Coolidge
(1923-1929), and Lyndon B. Johnson (whose administration ended in 1969), every Presi-
dent issued at least 1,150 grants of executive clemency in some form, with the exception of
John F. Kennedy, who issued 575 such grants in his abbreviated administration. P.S. Ruck-
man, Jr., Federal Executive Clemency in the United States, 1789-1995: A Preliminary Re-
port (1995), available at http://ednet.rvc.cc.il.us/-PeterR/Papers/paper3.htm. Beginning
with Richard Nixon, however, the exercise of the federal clemency power has decreased
substantially. President Nixon issued 926 grants of clemency, and no President since then
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readily available. 54 Nonetheless, it appears that governors and other
clemency decisionmakers generally have become less willing to use
the clemency power. Professor VictoriaJ. Palacios contends that "the
commutation power is virtually dead because of the belief that 'super
due process' has virtually eliminated error and because the political
consequences of granting commutations are too great. ' 55 With re-
gard to clemency in capital cases, she concludes that "[i]n the last
quarter century, there has been a dramatic decline in death penalty
commutations-so much so that some say the clemency power is now
defunct."56 Adam M. Gershowitz agrees, stating that "[t]he decline in
executive clemency has been well documented (and lamented).' Al-
though Gershowitz's claim that the decline has been well-documented
may not be accurate, his underlying conclusion seems to be generally
accepted.
This decline in clemency comes at the same time that a number
of federal judges, including ChiefJustice Rehnquist, point to the exis-
tence of executive clemency as a reason to limit the scope of federal
habeas corpus, and as a justification for unforgiving rules of procedu-
ral default.58
The reinstitution, in Maryland, of the traditional policy of consid-
ering for parole or commutation prisoners sentenced to life with pa-
role is laudable.59 However, the use of that power still is quite
limited.60
D. The Enhanced Role of State Judges and the Increased Importance of
State Collateral Remedies
Several state appellate courts have recognized that the above limi-
tations, especially those on federal habeas corpus, justify a more
issued more than 600. See Ruckman, supra. Even with the glut of last-minute pardons
handed down by President Clinton, his total number of clemency grants was only 456.
Jonathan Peterson & Lisa Getter, Clinton Pardons Raise Questions of Timing, Motive, L.A.
TIMEs, Jan. 28, 2001. These data justify the conclusion that "[t]he presidential clemency
power has atrophied in the last half century." Palacios, supra note 46, at 348.
54. See Bedau, supra note 46, at 262 (noting that "[r]eadily accessible published infor-
mation leaves much to be desired"); Radelet & Zsembik, supra note 46, at 291 (noting that
"there is no single source which provides statistics regarding the frequency of clemency
and the names of prisoners who are awarded clemency in capital cases").
55. Palacios, supra note 46, at 313 (citations omitted).
56. Id. at 348.
57. Gershowitz, supra note 46, at 671 (citing Palacios, supra note 46).
58. See Palacios, supra note 46, at 335.
59. See supra note 18.
60. See supra note 18.
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searching level of review in state collateral cases. State v. Preciose6 is a
representative example.
In Preciose, the defendant filed a postconviction petition challeng-
ing the effectiveness of his lawyer, who represented him at trial and on
appeal. The postconviction court denied relief, and the intermediate
appellate court affirmed, holding that Preciose had waived his ineffec-
tiveness argument by failing to make it earlier.62 In an unreported
opinion, the intermediate appellate court said it was expressly ground-
ing its decision on this state procedural default to preclude federal
habeas review of the merits of the argument.63
The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed, holding that Preciose
had not waived his claims, and that he had established, prima facie,
that his lawyer was ineffective.64 The opinion admonished the state's
judiciary about the importance, particularly given the federal "retrench-
ment," of deciding issues on the merits rather than relying upon proce-
dural defaults:
It would be a bitter irony indeed if our courts, in an attempt
to accommodate the Supreme Court's retrenchment of fed-
eral habeas review, were artificially to elevate procedural rul-
ings over substantive adjudications in post-conviction review,
at a time when the Court's curtailment of habeas review
forces state prisoners to rely increasingly on state post-convic-
tion proceedings as their last resort for vindicating their state
and federal constitutional rights. . . . [W]hen meritorious
issues are raised that require analysis and explanation, our
traditions of comprehensive justice will best be served by de-
cisions that reflect thoughtful and thorough consideration
and disposition of substantive contentions.65
The court emphasized that state courts, unlike their federal coun-
terparts, cannot justify procedural default rules with federalism-based
arguments:
The Supreme Court's deference to state procedural bars is
based largely on comity and federalism-concerns that sim-
ply do not apply when this Court reviews procedural rulings
by our lower courts. Indeed, considerations of federalism
dictate that our state courts should enforce New Jersey's
61. 609 A.2d 1280 (N.J. 1992).
62. Id. at 1284.
63. id. at 1287.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1294.
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post-conviction rules without attempting to emulate the fed-
eral habeas decisions.66
The court added that the federal deference to state rules of pro-
cedural default "presumes well-reasoned state procedural defaults that
may in fact be the result of hostility towards federal rights or federal
right-holders or of outmoded state procedures."67 To avoid this, the
court suggested, state courts ought to make sure that, under their
rules, arguments in collateral cases are resolved on the merits when-
ever reasonably possible. If state courts do not do so, they will support
"a theory of federalism that subordinates the vindication of federal
constitutional rights to a state's enforcement of its procedural rules. 68
The court acknowledged that court decisions on the merits will pro-
duce more federal habeas decisions on the merits, but that is not in-
consistent with the legitimate state interest in finality:
From our state perspective, finality is achieved when our
courts grant or deny post-conviction relief. Any state courtjudgment later overturned by federal habeas review presum-
ably will have been undeserving of finality. We are not so
convinced of our infallibility, or so jealous of our sovereignty,
as to deem federal habeas review an undesirable intrusion on
our adjudications . . . . Where meritorious issues are
presented, our interest in affording defendants access to
both state post-conviction and federal habeas review out-
weighs our interest in finality through an unnecessarily-rigid
enforcement of state procedural rules. Simply put, consider-
ations of finality and procedural enforcement count for little
when a defendant's life or liberty hangs in the balance.69
66. Id. at 1292. The opinion cited DAmico v. Manson, 476 A.2d 543, 545-56 (Conn.
1984), in which the state court had applied a "less-restrictive standard to state post-convic-
tion petitions 'despite the later development of [the] more restrictive' [federal] standard
for federal habeas review." Preciose, 609 A.2d at 1292-93.
67. Preciose, 609 A.2d at 1291. The court did not ignore the legitimate interests under-
lying procedural default rules. Such rules "achieve[ ] the important state goals of finality
and judicial economy," avoid "disconnected and piecemeal" litigation, and "prevent[ ] the
abuse of post-conviction proceedings." Id. at 1292 (citations omitted).
68. Id. at 1291.
69. Id. at 1293. The court added: "Our compelling judicial interest in sustaining only
those convictions free from constitutional error is disserved by decisions of our courts or,
for that matter, federal courts that limit the availability of federal habeas review in cases in
which such review may be warranted." Id at 1281.
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III. MARYLAND COLLATERAL REMEDIES
A. Writ of Habeas Corpus
Although the PCPA has displaced habeas corpus as the primary
vehicle for challenging the legality of one's conviction, state habeas
still is an important remedy in Maryland. Like PCPA remedies,
"habeas corpus remedies are available only if the defendant is in cus-
tody or subject to conditions of parole or probation."
70
For example, it is a means by which a prisoner can challenge an
error by the Division of Correction (DOC) in calculating the pris-
oner's sentence,71 the DOC's failure to credit earned "good conduct
time" against a sentence, 72 the use of an invalid prior conviction as the
predicate for an enhanced sentence under a recidivism law, 73 the ret-
roactive application of a law requiring gubernatorial approval of pa-
role, 74 and the unlawful revocation of a prisoner's release under
"mandatory supervision." 75
Relief in habeas cases can include release of the petitioner or
measures short of release. A court "need not choose simply between
70. Fairbanks v. State, 331 Md. 482, 492 n.3, 629 A.2d 63, 68 n.3 (1993); see MD. CODE
ANN., CTs. & JUD. PROC. § 3-702 (2004). In Fairbanks, the court equated the "custody"
requirements for state habeas corpus and postconviction proceedings. 331 Md. at 492 n.3,
629 A.2d at 68 n.3. It cited McMannis v. State, 311 Md. 534, 536 A.2d 652 (1988), in which
the court cited with approval federal decisions that extended the federal habeas corpus
"custody" requirement to include the conditions of both post-incarceration parole and pre-
trial release on one's own recognizance.
71. E.g., Md. Corr. Inst. v. Lee, 362 Md. 502, 766 A.2d 80 (2001) (holding that the
alleged failure by the Division of Correction to clarify a commitment record, in conflict
with the sentence announced orally by the sentencing court, is cognizable by habeas
corpus); accord Mateen v. Galley, 146 Md. App. 623, 807 A.2d 708 (2002).
72. E.g., Md. House of Corr. v. Fields, 348 Md. 245, 261, 703 A.2d 167, 175 (1997).
"[A]n inmate is not required to utilize the [administrative] inmate grievance procedure,
and courts will entertain an inmate's petition for habeas corpus when the plaintiff alleges
entitlement to immediate release and makes a colorable claim that he or she has served
the entire sentence less any mandatory credits." Id. This holding was pursuant to MD.
CONsT. art. III, § 55, which "provides that 'the General Assembly shall pass no Law sus-
pending the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus.'" Fields, 348 Md. at 260, 703 A.2d at
175. Prisoners who seek uncredited good time, which if credited would not entitle them to
release, must assert their claim through the administrative Inmate Grievance Office. If
such a challenge is unsuccessful, they can pursue appeals in circuit court, and from those
decisions, to the Court of Special Appeals. See, e.g., Sec'y, Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corr.
Servs. v. Hutchinson, 359 Md. 320, 324, 753 A.2d 1024, 1026 (2000).
73. Fairbanks, 331 Md. at 488, 629 A.2d at 66.
74. Gluckstern v. Sutton, 319 Md. 634, 574 A.2d 898 (1990) (holding that such retroac-
tive application violated the Ex Post Facto Clause).
75. Sec'y, Dep't of Pub. Safety& Corr. Servs. v. Henderson, 351 Md. 438, 718 A.2d 1150
(1998). For pretrial inmates, habeas corpus also is the statutory mechanism to challenge
bail decisions. CTS. & Jut. PROC. § 3-707.
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discharge of the defendant and the denial of all relief, but may tailor
relief as justice may require. "76
The general statutory provisions authorizing appeals from finaljudgments do not apply to habeas corpus. Rather: "An appeal may be
taken from a final order in a habeas corpus case only where specifi-
cally authorized by statute."77 There are four statutes pertaining to
appeals or applications seeking leave to appeal in habeas corpus
cases.78 The one provision directly relevant to this article is section 7-
107 of the PCPA.79 This provision abolishes appeals in habeas cases
when a habeas petitioner challenges "the validity of confinement
under a sentence of death or imprisonment. '"80 Rephrased, section 7-
107 has no effect on an appeal when the petitioner does not "chal-
lenge the legality of a conviction of a crime or sentence of death or
imprisonment for the conviction of the crime."8" The test is whether
the habeas petition seeks relief for which the PCPA provides a rem-
edy.82 If it does, the decision denying or granting it is not
appealable.83
A prisoner still may use habeas corpus to challenge his conviction
and sentence, but, in order to understand this, and the development
of the primary postconviction remedy under the PCPA, a little history
is useful.
76. Lee, 362 Md. at 518, 766 A.2d at 89 (internal quotation marks omitted).
77. Gluckstern, 319 Md. at 652, 574 A.2d at 906.
78. Id.
79. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 7-107 (2004) (formerly codified, with some different
language, at art. 27, § 645A(e)). The others govern appeals from a bail decision, an extra-
dition decision, and a decision holding unconstitutional the law under which the peti-
tioner was convicted. Gluckstern, 319 Md. at 652-53, 574 A.2d at 906; see MD. CODE ANN.,
CRIM. PROC. § 9-110 (2001) (formerly codified, with some different language, at art. 41,
§ 2-210); CTS. &JUD. PROC. §§ 3-706 to -707.
80. CrM. PROC. § 7-107(b).
81. Id. § 7-107(b) (2) (ii). The important, but sometimes elusive, distinction is between
a habeas challenge to the sentence, which is not appealable, and one to the detention,
which is. See, e.g., Lee, 362 Md. at 517, 766 A.2d at 88; Mateen v. Galley, 146 Md. App. 623,
807 A.2d 708 (2002).
82. See infra Part III.C.
83. In Ruby v. State, 353 Md. 100, 724 A.2d 673 (1999), the court said that "[i]n 1965,
the Legislature added new language to the [PCPA] in subsection (e), which this Court has
interpreted as allowing appeals from habeas corpus cases 'in situations where the Post
Conviction Procedure Act did not provide a remedy, and thus was not a substitute for
habeas corpus.'" Id at 106 n.4, 724 A.2d at 676 n.4 (quoting Gluckstern, 319 Md. at 662,
574 A.2d at 912). In 1970, the General Assembly clarified that unsuccessful habeas corpus
petitioners could appeal to the Court of Special Appeals in those cases in which they were
not using habeas corpus to challenge their convictions or sentences. Act of May 5, 1970,
ch. 595, 1970 Md. Laws 1711, 1711-12 (codified as amended at CRIM. PROC. § 7-107).
982
2005] COLIATERAL REMEDIES IN CRIMINAL CASES IN MARYLAND 983
Prior to 1958, when the Maryland General Assembly enacted the
PCPA,84 the primary mechanism to challenge the legality of one's de-
tention was a writ of habeas corpus.8" Maryland's version of the writ
can be traced to early fourteenth century English common law.
86 Par-
liament eventually reduced this common-law remedy to statute by en-
acting "'the famous habeas corpus act, 31 Car. II. c. 2,' [which] was
'frequently considered as another magna carta of the kingdom."'
87 In
84. Act of April 4, 1958, ch. 44, 1958 Md. Laws 178 (codified as amended at MD. CODE
ANN., CRIM. PROC. §§ 7-101 to -301 (2004); previously codified at MD. CODE ANN. art. 27,
§ 645A(a)).
85. See generally Tomlinson, supra note 5. There were other common-law remedies as
well, including the writ of error coram nobis, which remains a viable postconviction remedy
today, especially for those who are no longer confined or in the custody of the state. 
See
Skok v. State, 361 Md. 52, 760 A.2d 647 (2000); Ruby, 353 Md. 100, 724 A.2d 673. "A writ of
error coram nobis is a common law tool primarily used to correct factual errors by a court."
Ruby, 353 Md. at 104, 724 A.2d at 675. Through it, a petitioner today can still "bring before
the court facts which were not brought into issue at the trial of the case, and which were
material to the validity and regularity of the proceedings, and which, if known by the court,
would have prevented the judgment." Madison v. State, 205 Md. 425, 432, 109 A.2d 96, 99
(1954). In Skok v. State, the Court of Appeals breathed new life into the writ of error coram
nobis, and in the process "overrul [ed] a multitude of cases, extending back to 1838, which
had given an extremely narrow scope to the writ." Harris v. Bd. of Educ., 375 Md. 21, 50,
825 A.2d 365, 382 (2003). At the threshold, the court held that Skok could appeal the
decision of the circuit court denying him relief despite Article 27, section 645A(e) of the
PCPA, which abolished appeals in coram nobis cases (as well as habeas corpus and others)
"which have heretofore been available for challenging the validity of incarceration under
sentence of death or imprisonment." Skok, 361 Md. at 63, 760 A.2d at 653. The court held
that this language did "not apply to one [like Skok] who has fully served his or her sen-
tence and is using coram nobis to challenge a conviction because of serious collateral con-
sequences." Id. at 63-64, 760 A.2d at 653. The court then expanded the traditional scope
of coram nobis by holding that a petitioner "who is suddenly faced with a significant collat-
eral consequence of his or her conviction, and who can legitimately challenge the convic-
tion on constitutional or fundamental grounds," can use coram nobis to challenge 
the
conviction based on "an error of law." Id. at 78, 760 A.2d at 661. The court limited its new
rule in several respects. First, "the grounds for challenging the criminal conviction must
be of a constitutional, jurisdictional or fundamental character." Id. Second, "a presump-
tion of regularity attaches to the criminal case, and the burden of proof is on the coram
nobis petitioner." Id. Third, "the coram nobis petitioner must be suffering or facing 
sig-
nificant collateral consequences from the conviction." Id. at 79, 760 A.2d at 661. Fourth,
"[b]asic principles of waiver are applicable to issues raised in coram nobis proceedings."
Id And fifth, "one is not entitled to challenge a criminal conviction by a coram nobis
proceeding if another statutory or common law remedy is then available." Id. at 80, 760
A.2d at 662; see Parker v. State, 160 Md. App. 672, 866 A.2d 885 (2005) (applying Skok).
86. In Olewiler v. Brady, 185 Md. 341, 345, 44 A.2d 807, 809 (1945), the court quoted
from an English decision, Secretary of State for Home Affairs v. O'Brien, [1923] 603 A.C. 609
(H.L. 1923) (appeal taken from lr.), to describe the origins of habeas corpus: "It is per-
haps the most important writ known to the constitutional law of England, affording as 
it
does a swift and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or confinement. It is 
of
immemorial antiquity, an instance of its use occurring in the thirty-third year of Edward 
I."
87. Olewiler, 185 Md. at 345"6, 44 A.2d at 809 (quoting 3 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES
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1809, the Maryland General Assembly "substantially re-enacted" theEnglish statute, "with some changes."88 In 1867, habeas was incorpo-
rated into the Maryland Constitution. 9
It was difficult, however, to adapt the historic writ to the needs of
the mid-twentieth-century criminal justice system. In some ways, the
writ provided too little; in others, too much.
Historically, the scope of the writ was exceedingly narrow. In1880, in In re Glenn,9 ° the Court of Appeals said that "the sole inquiry[in a habeas case] is, generally, whether the [trial court] had jurisdic-
tion of the offence recited and of the person of the party accused, and
whether the judgment or sentence recited in the commitment be such
as the [court] was authorized by law to render or impose."9 Habeas
could be used only to challenge a conviction or sentence that was not
merely erroneous, but an absolute nullity.
In the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s, the Supreme Court took the first
steps in what would come to be called the "criminal law revolution."92
As the Court recognized new rights, state prisoners obtained more
claims that they might assert in state collateral proceedings. The Su-
preme Court made it clear that prisoners could assert these rights onfederal habeas corpus9 3 and that it would not defer to unreasonable
state procedural default rules.94
88. Id. at 346, 44 A.2d at 809.
89. See MD. CONST. art. III, § 55 ("The General Assembly shall pass no Law suspending
the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus.").
90. 54 Md. 572 (1880).
91. Id. at 607. In Glenn, the court that issued the writ of habeas corpus was not in the
circuit in which the conviction had been entered. Id. at 610. The Court of Appeals sug-gested a broader role for habeas, in conjunction with a writ of certiorari, if the court hadbeen in the jurisdiction in which the conviction had been imposed. Id. Then, it mighthave issued both a writ of habeas corpus (bringing the prisoner, more precisely his "body,"before the court), and a writ of certiorari (bringing the record of conviction before the
court). Id. The prisoner then could "go behind the conviction recited in the warrant of
commitment to question the regularity of the proceedings upon which the conviction isfounded, or to impeach the conviction itself for errors therein, other than the want ofjurisdiction in the premises." Id. at 609. The Court of Appeals held, however, that in this
case, where an out-of-circuit court heard a habeas case and it was "heard and determined
upon the return to the writ alone," the conviction was presumed to be lawful. Id. at 607.
92. See Laurence A. Benner et al., Criminal Justice in the Supreme Court: A Review of UnitedStates Supreme Court Criminal and Habeas Corpus Decisions (October 4, 1999-October 1, 2000), 37CAL. W. L. REV. 239, 288 (2001); Tibute to the Honorable Robert C. Underwood, 1984 U. ILL. L.REV. 857, 861; BruceJ. Winick, Presumptions and Burdens of Proof in Determining Competency toStand Trial: An Analysis of Medina v. California and the Supreme Court's New Due Process Meth-
odology in Criminal Cases, 47 U. MiAMI L. REV. 817, 820 (1993); see also supra Part II.A.
93. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
94. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
[VOL. 64:968
2005] COLLATERAL REMEDIES IN CRIMINAL CASES IN MARYLAND 985
By comparison, in Maryland (as well as most other states), the
collateral remedies were more limited. This produced considerable
federal-state tension, which manifested itself most openly when fed-
eral courts had to decide whether to require state prisoners to exhaust
state remedies, and how much deference they ought to give to the
factual findings and legal conclusions of state courts. These tensions
surfaced in several Supreme Court decisions in which the Court first
urged state courts to expand the scope of state habeas,
95 then openly
criticized the failure of states to do so,96 and finally suggested that
states might be obligated by the United States Constitution to adopt
adequate postconviction measures.97
The Court of Appeals of Maryland answered this challenge in
1945 in Olewiler v. Brady.98 The court reiterated the basic rule that
state habeas corpus was available only to challenge a conviction that
was a "nullity."99 But it went on to adopt something of a jurisdictional
fiction that the United States Supreme Court had devised in Johnson v.
Zerbs&'.° that constitutional errors, at least serious ones, could deprive
a court of its jurisdiction "in the course of the proceedings,"'101 i.e.,
midway through a trial, and thereby render a conviction a nullity.'
0 2
95. See Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 113 (1935) (noting the state courts' power to
use habeas corpus to remedy a deprivation of the petitioner's "liberty without due process
of law in violation of the Constitution of the United States," and observing that "[u]pon
the state courts, equally with the courts of the Union, rests the obligation to guard and
enforce every right secured by that Constitution").
96. See generally Young v. Ragen, 337 U.S. 235, 236 (1949).
97. See Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336, 337 (1965) (per curiam) (noting that certiorari
had been granted to consider whether a state's failure to provide an effective postconvic-
tion remedy may violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
98. 185 Md. 341, 44 A.2d 807 (1945).
99. Id. at 344, 44 A.2d at 808.
100. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
101. Id. at 468.
102. In Zerbst, the Supreme Court reversed a federal habeas decision in which the dis-
trict court had denied relief, despite the fact that the petitioner had not knowingly and
voluntarily waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Id. at 467. The Supreme Court
said that "[s]ince the Sixth Amendment constitutionally entitles one charged with crime to
the assistance of counsel, compliance with this constitutional mandate is an essential juris-
dictional prerequisite to a federal court's authority to deprive an accused of his life or lib-
erty." Id. (emphasis added). Therefore, "[i]f the accused... is not represented by counsel
and has not competently and intelligently waived his constitutional right, the Sixth Amend-
ment stands as a jurisdictional bar to a valid conviction and sentence depriving him of his
life or his liberty." Id. at 468 (emphasis added). That is, the Court explained: "A court's
jurisdiction at the beginning of trial may be lost 'in the course of the proceedings' due to
failure to . . . provid[e] counsel for an accused who is unable to obtain counsel, who has
not intelligently waived this constitutional guaranty, and whose life or liberty is at stake."
Id. A conviction under these circumstances is void. Id. The opinion stressed that the
"principles" limiting habeas corpus "must be construed and applied so as to preserve-not
destroy-constitutional safeguards of human life and liberty." Id. at 465.
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The Maryland Court of Appeals said that "[r]ecent Supreme Court
cases hold that through violation of certain constitutional rights in
criminal procedure a trial court may lose its jurisdiction 'in the course
of the proceedings,' and its judgment may therefore be void."1 3 The
Court of Appeals said, however, that this addition to the nullity-only
basis for habeas relief did not encompass "mere error," for example,
"as to the number of peremptory challenges of jurors," or the errors
that Olewiler had alleged.10 4
If the restrictive scope of state habeas provided too little to pris-
oners, there were other aspects of habeas that provided too much.
Judicial decisions in habeas cases, whether granting or denying the
application for a writ, had no resjudicata effect. Therefore, prisoners
could file as many petitions as they wished.10 5 Neither party could
appeal a habeas decision, and thus there was no way to provide
finality.106
In 1945, the General Assembly responded, in part, to these
problems. It granted both the petitioner and the State the right to
appeal from a habeas corpus decision. 0 7 Although the General As-
sembly did not limit the petitioner's right to file successive petitions
before different judges, it did provide that, in a case in which a peti-
tioner had been granted a hearing on a prior petition, a subsequentjudge could refuse to issue the writ, i.e., decide not to bring the peti-
tioner before the court for a hearing. The subsequent judge was to
make this decision based on whether the successive petition presented
103. Olewiler, 185 Md. at 344, 44 A.2d at 808 (citing Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 468).
104. Id. at 345, 44 A.2d at 808. The errors included that Olewiler and his rifle, which he
used to kill the victim, had been unreasonably seized. Id at 343-44, 44 A.2d at 808. TheCourt of Appeals pointed out that there was no dispute about Olewiler's identity or that hehad shot the victim. Id. at 345, 44 A.2d at 809.
105. E.g., Ex parte Berman, 14 F. Supp. 716, 717 (D. Md. 1936); see also Charles Markell,Review of Criminal Cases in Maryland by Habeas Corpus and by Appeal 101 U. PA. L. REv. 1154,
1162 (1953).
106. See Berman, 14 F. Supp. at 717 ("Maryland practice provides for issuance of the writ
of habeas corpus by any of the State Judges but does not provide an appeal from theirdecisions. The refusal of the writ in one case is therefore not regarded as res adjudicata.").107. Markell, supra note 105, at 1157 (discussing Act of April 23, 1945, ch. 702, § 3C,1945 Md. Laws 768, 769). In 1947, the General Assembly amended the statute "to substi-
tute for a right of appeal a right 'to apply to the Court of Appeals ... for leave to prosecute
an appeal therefrom.'" Id, (quoting Act of April 26, 1947, ch. 625, § 3C, 1947 Md. Laws1562, 1563-64). Over the next few years, this substantially increased the workload of theCourt of Appeals. John D. Alexander, Jr., Note, The Maryland Version of the Uniform PostConviction Procedure Act, with Special Reference to the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 19 MD. L. REv. 233,235-36 (1959). In a 1958 report, the Maryland Administrative Office of the Courts de-
scribed the increases in the numbers of applications for leave to appeal habeas decisions.
There were a total of 203 in the six years prior to 1956, 82 in 1956, and 128 in 1957. Id. at
236 n.19.
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"new grounds of a substantial nature" or whether the prior grounds
had been "fully and adequately presented."
' 0
The enactment of the PCPA in 1958 slowed the common-law
evolution of habeas corpus in Maryland by abolishing appeals when
habeas is used to challenge convictions and sentences, and acceler-
ated its statutory development. Section 7-107(b) (2) (ii) of the PCPA
indicates, by negative implication (by barring appeals), that habeas
may be used to challenge the "legality of a conviction" or of a "sen-
tence." 109  Maryland Rule 15-304 gives the petitioner a PCPA-or-
habeas choice. When a petitioner files a habeas petition, "the judge
may order that the petition be treated as a petition under the Post
Conviction Procedure Act if the individual confined consents in writ-
ing or on the record and the judge is satisfied that the post conviction
proceeding is adequate to test the legality of the confinement."
110
This alternative approach, in the discretion of the petitioner, is consis-
tent with the history of the PCPA."' In response to history and text,
appellate courts seem to accept that habeas now has the same scope as
the PCPA. 1 2
The choice offered to petitioners is weighted in favor of the
PCPA, however, to advance the goal of making the PCPA the uniform
collateral remedy. The PCPA provides counsel to indigent petition-
ers,'" 3 gives them a right to a hearing,'
4 and provides that an unsuc-
108. Markell, supra note 105, at 1161. In a 1948 decision, the court "[a]ssum[ed], with-
out deciding, that notwithstanding the Act of 1945, the doctrine of res judicata does not
extend to a decision on habeas corpus .... nevertheless such a [prior] decision is not
without weight on a later application." State ex rel Eyer v. Warden, 190 Md. 767, 772, 
59
A.2d 745, 747 (1948) (citation omitted). Markell thought that, by 1953, the abuses of the
writ had been substantially redressed
by abolishing the general (though not universal) practice of issuing the writ as a
matter of course, without any showing of need for it, and by giving a general right
of appeal, thus substituting authoritative statements of the law for the action of 
37
judges, of equal authority [apparently the number of trial judges in Maryland],
not subject to review by any higher court.
Markell, supra note 105, at 1163.
109. MD. CODE ANN., CrIM. PROC. § 7-107(b) (2) (ii) (2004).
110. MD. R. 15-304.
111. See infta Part III.C.1.b.
112. In Maryland Correctional Institution v. Lee, 362 Md. 502, 766 A. 2d 80 (2001), the
court said that "habeas corpus is an appropriate method to challenge the lawfulness 
of an
underlying conviction and detention." Id. at 517, 766 A.2d at 89. It quoted from 
the
Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the Maryland Code, which states:
(a) Petition. A person committed, detained, confined, or restrained from his law-
ful liberty within the State for any alleged offense or under any other color or
pretense or any person in his behalf, may petition for writ of habeas corpus to the
end that the cause of the commitment, detainer, confinement, or restraint may
be inquired into.
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-702(a) (2002).
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cessful petitioner can seek leave to appeal an adverse decision.' 15 The
habeas provisions do not provide these rights."16
On the other hand, a habeas petitioner can file the petition with
any judge in the state,' 1 7 and the provisions that govern successive
petitions and the assertion of new grounds for relief are more flexible
than those in the PCPA.1 1 8
B. Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence
Maryland Rule 4-345 (a) provides that a "court may correct an ille-
gal sentence at any time.""' 9 The motion is "part of the same criminal
proceeding" in which the sentence was imposed and is "not a wholly
independent action."12 It "simply grants the trial court limited con-
tinuing authority in the criminal case to revise the sentence."' 2'
In noncapital cases, Maryland's appellate courts have allowed liti-
gants to bring a variety of claims about improper sentences, including
claims that: (1) no sentence could have lawfully been imposed, for
example, because the double jeopardy guarantee prohibited trial, and
therefore barred any sentence, on a charge; 122 (2) a sentence ex-
113. MD. CODE ANN., CIM. PROC. § 7-108 ann. (2004).
114. Id. § 7 -108(a).
115. Id. § 7 -109(a).
116. See CTS. &JUD. PROC. §§ 3-701 to -707; MD. R. 15-301 to -312.
117. CTS. &JuD. PROC. § 3-701; In re Glenn, 54 Md. 572 (1880).118. Maryland Rule 15-303(e)(3) provides, if a petition otherwise complies with the
rules, the judge shall grant the writ unless "the legality of the confinement was determinedin a prior habeas corpus or other post conviction proceeding, and no new ground is shown
sufficient to warrant issuance of the writ." If a petitioner alleges new grounds, subsection(e) (3) (C) requires the petitioner to demonstrate "good reason why new grounds . . . were
not raised in previous proceedings." If a previous judge has given the petitioner a hearing
on a petition "for release from confinement under the same commitment," the subsequentjudge has discretion to deny the writ. CTS. & Jun. PROC. § 3-7 03(a). "In exercising hisdiscretion the judge may consider whether new grounds of a substantial nature appear to
exist for granting of the writ or whether the grounds for the issuance of any former writ
were fully and adequately presented." Id. In contrast, the PCPA contains a single-petition
limitation and stricter waiver rules. See infra Parts III.C.1.c, III.C.1.h.
119. MD. R. 4-345. The rule also authorizes courts to revise sentences that are the prod-
ucts of "fraud, mistake, or irregularity," thus providing a remedy even when a sentence is
not illegal. Id. 4-345(b).
120. State v. Kanaras, 357 Md. 170, 183, 742 A.2d 508, 516 (1999).
121. Id. at 184, 742 A.2d at 516.
122. State v. Griffiths, 338 Md. 485, 496-97, 659 A.2d 876, 882 (1995) (holding that theimposition of a sentence on a greater offense precluded a sentence for a lesser-included
offense). The court in Griffiths suggested that there might be a constitutional requirement
that Maryland provide a mechanism to challenge an unconstitutional sentence:
In view of our holding that Maryland Rule 4-345 (a) provides an adequate existingprocedure for vacating the sentence imposed on the lesser offense, we need not
consider whether the constitutional imperative to prevent multiple punishments
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ceeded the maximum authorized by law, for example, because it was
for a lesser-included offense and it exceeded the maximum sentence
for the greater offense;' 23 and (3) although the sentence was author-
ized by law, a court erred procedurally in imposing it, for example, by
imposing a life sentence without realizing it had discretion to suspend
all or part of that sentence.
124
Given the special need for reliable and accurate decisionmaking
in capital cases, the Court of Appeals has expanded the scope of mo-
tions to correct illegal sentences in capital cases. In Evans v. 
State,125
the court noted its earlier holding that a capital defendant may allege
in a Rule 4-345(a) motion that "an alleged error of constitutional di-
mension may have contributed to [a] death sentence, at least where
the allegation of error is partly based upon a decision of the United
States Supreme Court or of this Court rendered after the defendant's
capital sentencing proceeding."'2 6  Evans contended in his motion
that the trial court had applied at his sentencing hearing "an amend-
ment to the Maryland death penalty statute" that "became effective a
few months after the murders [for which he was convicted]," and that
this "violated the ex post facto clauses of the United States and Mary-
land constitutions. "127 The court allowed Evans to assert this claim as
an exception to the general rule that "a Rule 4-345(a) motion to cor-
would mandate vacatur of the sentence even in the absence of a state procedure
specifically authorizing that action.
Id. at 497 n.8, 659 A.2d at 882 n.8.
123. Gerald v. State, 299 Md. 138, 472 A.2d 977 (1984) (holding that, since the maxi-
mum sentence for robbery was ten years, the defendant, upon conviction of the lesser-
included offense of assault, could not legally be sentenced to more than ten years).
124. State v. Chaney, 375 Md. 168, 174-75, 825 A.2d 452, 455 (2003) (considering
"whether, on [the] record, the trial judge failed to recognize that he had the discretion to
suspend all or a portion of the life sentence imposed in this case, and, if so, does that error
require a new sentencing proceeding"). Chaney was filed under several procedural theo-
ries, but the appeal clarified that it was being prosecuted as a motion to correct an illegal
sentence. See State v. Wooten, 277 Md. 114, 352 A.2d 829 (1976); infra note 135 and ac-
companying text; see also Randall Book Corp. v. State, 316 Md. 315, 558 A.2d 715 (1989)
(holding that an appeal from a denial of a motion to correct an illegal sentence is not
precluded by the PCPA when there has been no imprisonment, parole, or probation).
The Randall court noted that arguments that sentences violate double jeopardy and consti-
tute "cruel and unusual punishment[s]" are within the scope of a motion to correct an
illegal sentence, but the contention that the trial judge "was motivated by impermissible
considerations," is not within the scope of Rule 4-345. Id. at 322, 558 A.2d at 719.
125. 382 Md. 248, 855 A.2d 291 (2004).
126. Id. at 279, 855 A.2d at 309 (citing Oken v. State, 378 Md. 179, 835 A.2d 1105
(2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1017 (2004)).
127. Id. at 251, 855 A.2d at 292-93.
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rect an illegal sentence is not appropriate where the alleged illegality
'did not inhere in [the defendant's] sentence.'"128
The Evans court said it had established the death-penalty excep-
tion to this general principle in Oken v. State.1 29 In Oken, the court, in
a Rule 4-345 proceeding, considered and rejected the argument that
Maryland's death penalty statute was unconstitutional because it does
not require, before the jury imposes death, that the State prove be-
yond a reasonable doubt that aggravating circumstances outweigh mit-
igating circumstances.'1 0  Both Oken and Evans based their
arguments on Supreme Court decisions rendered after their capital
sentencing proceedings.1 3 1
Maryland's appellate courts have narrowly described the scope of
claims cognizable in a Rule 4-345 motion in a noncapital case. The
court in Evans, for example, said: "A motion to correct an illegal sen-
tence ordinarily can be granted only where there is some illegality in
the sentence itself or where no sentence should have been im-
posed."1 3 2 That is, "a trial court error during the sentencing proceed-
ing is not ordinarily cognizable under Rule 4-345(a) where the
resulting sentence or sanction is itself lawful."'3 3
The scope, however, may be somewhat broader, as measured by
the application of these principles. In State v. Kanaras, 3 4 a decision
that the Evans court cites, the Court of Appeals allowed an appeal of a
Rule 4-345 ruling on the question of whether an event subsequent to
the imposition of sentence-Governor Glendening's refusal to con-
sider parole for life-sentenced prisoners-retroactively changed life-
with-parole into life-without-parole sentences, in violation of the pro-
hibition of ex post facto laws. And, in State v. Chaney,l1 5 the court
considered a case where the allegedly illegal sentence was within legal
limits, but the trial court allegedly imposed the sentence without
knowledge that it had the discretion to suspend all or part of it.
There are important procedural features of a Rule 4-345 motion
that the other collateral remedies do not share. For example, the revi-
sory power under the rule is not subject to the restrictions that govern
128. Id. at 278, 855 A.2d at 309 (quoting State v. Kanaras, 357 Md. 170, 185, 742 A.2d
508, 517 (1999)).
129. 378 Md. 179, 835 A.2d 1105 (2003).
130. Id. at 184-85, 835 A.2d at 1108.
131. Oken relied on Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 166 (2000), and Ringv. Arizona, 536
U.S. 584 (2002), and Evans relied on Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513 (2000).
132. Evans, 382 Md. at 278-79, 855 A.2d at 309.
133. Id. at 279, 855 A.2d at 309.
134. 357 Md. 170, 742 A.2d 508 (1999).
135. 375 Md. 168, 825 A.2d 452 (2003).
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PCPA petitions. Although res judicata and law-of-the-case principles
apply so courts need not entertain a successive motion that repeats
allegations that a court previously has rejected," 6 there is no statute of
limitations for filing the motion,1 37 the waiver rules under the PCPA
do not apply,13 8 and there is a right of appeal from an adverse
decision. 139
On the other hand, unlike first-time postconviction proceedings,
courts need not appoint counsel to represent parties who file motions
to correct illegal sentences,1 40 and although a court may not grant
relief without holding a hearing, it can deny relief without doing so.1 4 1
C. The Maryland Postconviction Procedure Act
In 1958, Maryland became the second state to adopt the Uniform
Post-Conviction Procedure Act (UPCPA). a42 The Act protected a
136. See Scott v. State, 150 Md. App. 468, 474, 822 A.2d 472, 475 (2003) (holding that
the court was not "required to consider anew repeated motions" that rested upon "the
same facts" and allegations).
137. The rule specifically states that, as long as the sentence is illegal, the court may
correct it "at any time." MD. R. 4-345(a); Mateen v. Saar, 376 Md. 385, 397, 829 A.2d 1007,
1014 (2003); Kanaras, 357 Md. at 180, 742 A.2d at 514 (stating that the "trial court clearly
has the authority and responsibility to correct an illegal sentence at any time" (quoting
Carter v. Warden, 210 Md. 657, 124 A.2d 574 (1956))).
138. See Walczak v. State, 302 Md. 422, 427, 488 A.2d 949, 951 (1985) ("[A] defendant
who fails to object to the imposition of an illegal sentence .. .waive forever his right to
challenge that sentence.").
139. In Kanaras, the court reexamined its inconsistent prior decisions about whether the
losing party could appeal a decision on a motion to correct an illegal sentence. 357 Md. at
183, 742 A.2d at 516. The court disavowed those decisions in which it had indicated that
the PCPA had abolished any right of appeal, noting that the language of the PCPA, which
bars appeals from "statutory remedies which have heretofore been available for challenging the valid-
ity of incarceration," did not apply to motions to correct illegal sentences under Maryland
Rule 4-345(a). lId at 177, 742 A.2d at 512. The court quoted from Judge Eldridge's dis-
senting opinion in Valentine v. State, 305 Md. 108, 123, 501 A.2d 847, 854 (1985) (Eldridge,
J., dissenting), in which he said "the fact that the Maryland Rules have the force of law does
not mean that a rule is a statute." Kanaras, 357 Md. at 183, 742 A.2d at 516. The Kanaras
opinion also pointed out that the PCPA barred appeals from actions that challenged "in-
carceration," and a motion to correct illegal sentence was neither an independent action,
nor was it limited to sentences that imposed incarceration. Id. at 183-84, 742 A.2d at 516.
140. See MD. R. 4-214(b). A convicted defendant who moves for a modification of his
sentence under 4-345(b) within the ninety-day period prescribed by that subsection has a
statutory right to counsel. State v. Flansburg, 345 Md. 694, 702, 694 A.2d 462, 466 (1997).
141. Subsection (e) (2) of Rule 4-345 refers to the denial of a motion without a hearing
and subsection (f) states that "[n]o hearing shall be held . .. until the court determines
that the notice requirements in section (e) (2) of this Rule have been satisfied." MD. R. 4-
345(e), (f).
142. Act of April 4, 1958, ch. 44, 1958 Md. Laws 178 (codified as amended at MD. CODE
ANN., CRIM. PROC. §§ 7-101 to -301 (2004)). In 1955, the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws originally adopted the Uniform Act. UNIF. POsT-CONVIC-
TION PROCEDURE A-r, 11A U.L.A. 267 (1995). The 1955 Act was superseded by the 1966
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broad array of rights, placed limits on collateral litigation (especially
through resjudicata and "waiver" provisions), and took a step toward
unifying the various collateral remedies by making the postconviction
process the primary means of asserting collateral claims.143 By giving
state courts the first opportunity to adjudicate these claims, and by
creating a fair adjudicatory process, the General Assembly provided a
structure that would protect state decisions, and state sovereignty, dur-
ing federal habeas review.
1. Central Provisions of the PCPA.-
a. Eligible Petitioners.-The original Act provided that "[a] ny
person convicted of a crime and incarcerated under sentence of death
or imprisonment... may institute a proceeding under this Act." 44 In
1965, the General Assembly added to the list of eligible petitioners
people "on parole or probation. 1 4 5
UNIF. POST-CONVICTION PROCEDURE ACT, llA U.L.A. 274 (1995), which was superseded by
the 1980 UNIF. POST-CONVICTION PROCEDURE ACT, 11 U.L.A. 249 (1995). The 1980 Act
allows "[a] person convicted of and sentenced for a crime" to "institute a proceeding ap-
plying for relief" upon one of eight grounds. 1980 UNIF. POST-CONVITION PROCEDURE ACT
§ 1 (a), 11 U.L.A. at 249-50.
143. See generally Tomlinson, supra note 5; Alexander, supra note 107. Today, every state
provides convicted defendants with at least one type of postconviction remedy; many pro-
vide multiple remedies. See generally WILKES, supra note 4, at 16-30. Fifteen states have
enacted some version of the UPCPA, and these acts remain in force in twelve of those
fifteen states. As of July 2004, the ten states that'currently have some statutory version of
the UPCPA are Maryland, Montana, Oregon (primarily based on the original 1955 version
of the UPCPA); Idaho, Iowa, Minnesota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, and South Carolina
(primarily based on the 1966 revision); and North Dakota (primarily based on the 1980
revision). MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. §§ 7-101 to -301; MONT. CODE ANN., §§ 46-21-101 to
-111 (2003); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 138.005-.504. (2005); IDAHO CODE §§ 19-4901 to -4911
(Michie 2004); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 822.1-.11 (West 2003); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 590.01-.06
(West 2005); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 332 (2004); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 10-9.1-1 to -12
(2004); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 17-27-10 to -160 (Law. Co-op. 2004); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 29-
32.1-01 to -14 (2003). Additionally, Arkansas, Nevada and South Dakota enacted versions
of the UPCPA, but then repealed them. Wilkes points out that two additional states, Alaska
and Indiana, have adopted some form of the UPCPA by court rule. WILKES, supra note 4,
at 214; see ALASKA R. 35.1; IND. R. PCI.
144. § 645A(a), 1958 Md. Laws at 179.
145. Act of April 8, 1965, ch. 442, § 645A(a), 1965 Md. Laws 634, 634. In McMannis v.
State, the Court of Appeals held that a West Virginia prisoner whose sentence was en-
hanced under that state's recidivist statute, but predicated on an earlier Maryland convic-
tion, could not use Maryland's PCPA to challenge the earlier sentence. 311 Md. 534, 536
A.2d 652 (1988). The court noted that to invoke the PCPA, one had to be in Maryland's
custody, i.e., incarcerated or on parole or probation in Maryland. Id. at 539, 536 A.2d at
654. The court declined to broadly construe the custody requirement, despite the expan-
sive interpretation of similar federal statutes by federal courts, saying that
where a person in another state has fully served a sentence imposed by Maryland
and is in no sense being detained by, or at the direction of, Maryland, the chal-
lenge to an earlier Maryland conviction that is having some collateral, albeit sig-
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b. Claims Within the Scope of the Act.-The Act consolidated
the collateral process by bringing within it claims that had been cogni-
zable under habeas corpus and other common-law writs. Under the
original Act, petitioners could assert
that the [trial] court was without jurisdiction to impose the
sentence, or that the sentence exceeds the maximum author-
ized by law, or that the sentence is otherwise subject to collat-
eral attack upon any ground of alleged error heretofore
available under a writ of habeas corpus, writ of coram nobis,
or other common law or statutory remedy.'46
The current Act contains these provisions with minor nonsubstantive
revisions.147
Most important, in enacting the PCPA, the General Assembly also
expanded the scope of collateral relief by providing that petitioners
could allege "that the sentence or judgment was imposed in violation
of the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution or laws of
this State. ' 48 This liberated the collateral remedy from its habeas his-
tory, which initially had allowed relief only when convictions were nul-
lities. It gave the state courts the mechanism they needed to provide
more complete relief to collateral petitioners, including relief that im-
plemented federal court decisions, and thereby helped to protect
state court decisions in federal habeas corpus proceedings.
The original grounds for postconviction relief remain the
grounds for relief under the Act today.149
c. The Number of Permissible Petitions.-Over thirty-seven
years, the General Assembly has reduced the number of petitions one
could file from unlimited to two,1 50 to one with an opportunity to re-
open "in the interests of justice." 15  The articulated goal, as it has
nificant, consequence upon the petitioner's imprisonment because of the law of
the state of imprisonment should more properly be brought in the state that con-
fines him.
Id at 54142, 543, 536 A.2d at 656.
146. § 645A(a), 1958 Md. Laws at 179.
147. CRIM. PROC. § 7-102 (a) (2)-(4). As discussed in Part II, the PCPA did not eliminate
the writ of habeas corpus nor any of the other common-law and statutory collateral reme-
dies, but it moved towards a unified system by abolishing the right of appeal for those
remedies that "have heretofore been available for challenging the validity of incarceration
under sentence of death or imprisonment" when petitioners used them to assert claims
cognizable under the PCPA. § 645A(b), 1958 Md. Laws at 179.
148. § 645A(a), 1958 Md. Laws at 179.
149. CRIM. PROC. § 7-102.
150. Act of May 27, 1986, ch. 647, 1986 Md. Laws 2387, 2388.
151. ClM. PROC. §§ 7-103, 7-104. The one-petition-only amendment, with the "interests
ofjustice" reopening caveat, was enacted in 1995. See infra Part IV.B.
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been with federal habeas corpus, has been to give petitioners one full
and fair opportunity to litigate their collateral claims.
"As originally enacted in 1958, the Act did not place any limit on
the number of post conviction petitions which a petitioner was enti-
tled to file." 152 The original Act contained a provision, repealed in
1965 as part of a series of amendments,153 which provided:
All grounds for relief claimed by a petitioner under this Act
must be raised in his original or amended petition, and any
grounds not so raised are waived unless the court on hearing
a subsequent petition finds grounds for relief asserted
therein which could not reasonably have been raised in the
original or amended petition. 154
This original provision is interesting because it resembles the ba-
sic structure of the current Act. Under the original Act, the petitioner
could file an original and amended petition, and could file a subse-
quent petition if the claims in the second petition "could not reasona-
bly have been raised" before. 15 5 Today, a petitioner can file a single
petition, with "freely allowed" amendments "in order to do substantial
justice,"'15' and can subsequently reopen that proceeding if "the inter-
ests of justice" warrant it. 15 7
In 1986, the General Assembly limited the number of petitions a
prisoner could file to two.1 5  The Court of Appeals held that the new
two-petition-only provision could not be applied retroactively. 159
In 1995, the General Assembly reduced from two to one the num-
ber of postconviction petitions that a petitioner can file but added the
"interests ofjustice" reopening provision noted above. 160 In Part IV.B,
I trace the legislative history of this provision, and make some sugges-
tions about how courts might interpret it.
d. Statutes of Limitations.-The original Act had no statute of
limitations. It provided that a petition could "be filed at any time."161
152. Mason v. State, 309 Md. 215, 217-18, 522 A.2d 1344, 1345 (1987).
153. Act of April 8, 1965, ch. 442, § 2, 1965 Md. Laws 634, 636; see infra Part III.C.l.h.
154. § 645H, 1958 Md. Laws at 181.
155. Id. The General Assembly deleted this provision in 1965 when it added new waiver
provisions to the Act. 1965 Md. Laws at 634; see Tomlinson, supra note 5, at 951-53.
156. MD. R. 4-402(c).
157. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 7-104 (2004).
158. Act of May 27, 1986, ch. 647, 1986 Md. Laws 2387, 2388.
159. Mason v. State, 309 Md. 215, 221-22, 522 A.2d 1344, 1347 (1987).
160. Act of April 11, 1995, ch. 258, 1995 Md. Laws 1473, 1482. For the effect of these
amendments on prisoners who had filed previous petitions, see Grayson v. State, 354 Md. 1,
728 A.2d 1280 (1999).
161. Act of April 4, 1958, ch. 44, § 645A(b), 1958 Md. Laws 178, 179.
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In 1991, the General Assembly established a statute of limitations for
filing initial capital postconviction petitions, requiring that they be
filed 240 days after decision by the United States Supreme Court on
direct appeal (either affirming the death sentence or denying certio-
rari), or the expiration of the time for seeking certiorari from the
Supreme Court on direct appeal.1 6 2 The new provisions authorized a
court to extend time for filing an initial capital postconviction petition
for good cause.163
The 1991 General Assembly rejected a proposed three-year stat-
ute of limitations for filing noncapital postconviction petitions.
164
In 1995, the General Assembly imposed a ten-year statute of limi-
tations for noncapital postconviction petitions, absent "extraordinary
cause," but gave that provision prospective effect only.
1 65
The 1995 revisions also reduced from 240 to 210 days the period
of time a death-sentenced prisoner has to file his initial petition,'
66
established the ground rules for capital offenders who wish to waive
their rights to file postconviction petitions, 167 and established or mod-
ified timelines for the litigation of capital postconviction
proceedings.
168
162. Act of May 24, 1991, ch. 499, § 645A(a) (3), 1991 Md. Laws 2992, 2996. The initial
proposal for the statute of limitations was 180 days. See id. at 2995.
163. Id at 2996.
164. The proposed provision, which was deleted by amendment, provided: "[A] peti-
tion shall be filed within 3 years after the challenged conviction has become final unless
extraordinary cause for the delay is shown." See id- at 2995. It made an exception for new
decisions to be applied retroactively. Id. at 2997.
165. In 1995, the General Assembly amended subsection (a) (2) of § 645A. Act of May 9,
1995, ch. 258, 1995 Md. Laws 2091, 2091-92. As amended, it provided: "Unless extraordi-
nary cause is shown, in a case in which a sentence of death has not been imposed, a peti-
tion under this subtitle may not be filed later than 10 years from the imposition of
sentence," and "[ t] hat this Act shall be construed prospectively to apply only to postconvic-
tion proceedings for sentences imposed on or after the effective date of this Act [October
1, 1995] and may not be applied or interpreted to have any effect on or application to
postconviction petitions for sentences imposed before the effective date of this Act." Id. at
2091-92. In Grayson v. State, the Court of Appeals held that the prohibition against filing a
petition more than ten years after sentencing did not apply to a sentence that was imposed
in 1966, making it clear that the latter provision means exactly what it appears to say. 354
Md. 1, 15, 728 A.2d 1280, 1286 (1999).
166. § 645A(a) (3), 1995 Md. Laws at 1482.
167. § 645A(a) (5), 1995 Md. Laws at 1483. This provision states that a defendant in a
case where a death sentence has been imposed may waive his right to a postconviction
petition. Id Such a waiver must be "[k]nowing, voluntary, intelligent; and. . . in writing,"
and the defendant may revoke such a waiver if he does so within fifteen days. Id
168. § 645A(g), 1995 Md. Laws at 1485. The capital prisoner's hearing must be set
within thirty days after the petition is filed, and must take place within ninety days after the
petition is filed. Id.
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e. Rights to Appointed Counsel and a Heaing.-The original
Act required that a court appoint counsel to represent indigent peti-
tioners, 169 and contained ambiguous language about whether a hear-
ing was mandatory."' 0 The Act did not specify how courts should deal
with multiple petitions.
In 1959, the General Assembly addressed this issue by authorizing
a court, after considering the State's response to a subsequent peti-
tion, to dismiss that petition without appointing counsel or holding a
hearing if the court found that the petition contained no ground for
relief that "could not reasonably have been raised in the original or
amended petition. "171
In 1983, the General Assembly made it clear that a hearing and
appointment of counsel for the first petition were mandatory. It ad-
ded language to the Act providing that: "A petitioner is entitled to the
assistance of counsel and a hearing on the first petition filed by the
petitioner under this section. "172 Addressing subsequent petitions, it
said: "The court shall determine whether to grant assistance of coun-
sel or a hearing on subsequent petitions."1 73
In 1986, when the General Assembly limited the number of peti-
tions a prisoner could file to two, it authorized, but did not require, a
court to appoint counsel and hold a hearing on a "subsequent" (i.e.,
second) petition. 174
Similarly, in 1995, when the General Assembly reduced from two
to one the number of postconviction petitions that a petitioner can
file, and authorized courts to "reopen a postconviction proceeding
that was previously concluded if the court determines that such action
is in the interests ofjustice," it left within a court's discretion whether,
on a motion to reopen, it should appoint counsel to represent a peti-
tioner and hold a hearing.1 75
169. Act of April 4, 1958, ch. 44, § 645E, 1958 Md. Laws 178, 180.
170. Id. § 645G, 1958 Md. Laws 180-81. The Act precluded the trial judge from hearing
the postconviction petition unless the petitioner consented to this. Id. Maryland Rule 4-
406 now contains this provision.
171. Act of April 8, 1959, ch. 429, § 645H, 1959 Md. Laws 558, 560.
172. Act of May 10, 1983, ch. 234, § 645A(f), 1983 Md. Laws 910, 911.
173. Id.
174. Act of May 27, 1986, ch. 647, § 645A(f), 1986 Md. Laws 2387, 2388.
175. Act of April 11, 1995, ch. 110, § 645A(a) (2), 1995 Md. Laws 1473, 1482. The origi-
nal Act authorized the court to "receive proof by affidavits, depositions, oral testimony, or
other evidence." § 645G, 1958 Md. Laws at 181. This provision is now contained in Mary-
land Rule 4 -4 06(c). In Part IV.A, I argue that by authorizing proof by deposition, the
General Assembly intended to give courts discretion to allow at least limited discovery in
postconviction cases.
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f The Qualified Right to Appeal.-The original Act provided
for a discretionary appeal to the Court of Appeals, then Maryland's
only appellate court.
1 7 6
In 1966, the General Assembly amended the Act to divide respon-
sibility for appeals between the Court of Appeals and the then-new
Court of Special Appeals. It vested sole jurisdiction in the Court of
Special Appeals to hear appeals in noncapital postconviction cases, by
leave of court, and sole jurisdiction in the Court of Appeals to hear
appeals in capital postconviction cases, by leave of court.177 Current
law remains the same.178 In construing the applicable provisions, the
Court of Appeals has drawn an important distinction: When the Court
of Special Appeals exercises its discretion either to grant or deny an
appeal, the Court of Appeals may not review that discretionary judg-
ment. However, when the Court of Special Appeals grants leave to
appeal and decides the appeal, the Court of Appeals, through its certi-
orari power, may review, on the merits, that appellate decision.
1 79
g. Res Judicata.-The original Act conditioned the right of
petitioners to bring a claim on the requirement that it "has not been
previously and finally litigated." 8 ° In 1965, the General Assembly ad-
ded clarifying language. 8 1 It separated prior court decisions into ap-
pellate and trial decisions. With respect to appellate decisions, it said
that "an allegation of error shall be deemed to be finally litigated
176. Such an appeal could be requested by filing an "appl[ication] ... for leave to
prosecute an appeal." § 6451, 1958 Md. Laws at 181. The Act provided that if the "applica-
tion is denied, the order sought to be reviewed shall thereby become final to the same
extent and with the same effect as if said order had been affirmed on appeal." Id.
177. Act of March 23, 1966, ch. 12, § 6451, 1966 Md. Laws 23, 33. The General Assembly
deleted language from section 6451 that provided that a denial of leave to appeal was a
final order "to the same extent and with the same effect as if said order had been affirmed
on appeal." Id. In 1976, the General Assembly removed references to appeals to the Court
of Appeals from the Act. Act of May 4, 1976, ch. 472, § 645A(e), 1976 Md. Laws 1234,
1243.
178. See MD. CODE ANN., CrIM. PROC. § 7-109 (2004); see also MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD.
PROC. § 12-202 (2004) (providing that "review by way of certiorari may not be granted by
the Court of Appeals in a case or proceeding in which the Court of Special Appeals has
denied or granted: (1) Leave to prosecute an appeal in a post conviction proceeding").
179. Grayson v. State, 354 Md. 1, 11, 728 A.2d 1280, 1285 (1999).
180. § 645A(a), 1958 Md. Laws at 179.
181. There were several decisions prior to 1965 dealing with the "finally litigated" and
"waiver" issues. See, e.g., Rudolph v. Warden, 217 F. Supp. 579 (D. Md. 1963) (questioning
whether after the repeal by the PCPA of the right to seek leave to appeal habeas decisions,
the denial on procedural grounds of a Maryland prisoner's claim meant that the claim had
been "finally litigated"); Plater v. Warden, 220 Md. 673, 673, 154 A.2d 811, 811 (1959)
(holding that an issue raised in a postconviction proceeding had been "finally litigated" in
a prior habeas corpus proceeding when the Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal the
lower court's denial of relief, thereby affirming that judgment).
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when the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision on the merits
thereof, either upon direct appeal or upon any consideration of an application
for leave to appeal filed [under the Act] ."182 The language is somewhat
confusing because denial of discretionary review is not usually consid-
ered to be a decision "on the merits." Maryland's appellate courts
have not squarely resolved whether a denial of leave to appeal means
that the claims in it have been "previously and finally litigated." The
Court of Special Appeals, however, has held that claims in a previous
postconviction decision have not been "finally litigated" when the pe-
titioner did not seek leave to appeal.18 3
If denial of leave to appeal satisfies the "finally decided" test, this
should be a relatively weak form of res judicata. In later determining
whether to reopen a prior postconviction proceeding, a court should
keep in mind that there is no statutory requirement that counsel re-
present indigent prisoners who seek leave to appeal from adverse de-
cisions. This leaves to indigent prisoners the task of preparing
appellate papers in many, often complex cases.
Also, the Maryland Rule governing "application[s] for leave to
appeal [postconviction decisions] to [the] Court of Special Appeals"
does not require, or allow, applicants to file the transcript of a post-
conviction proceeding, but only the pleadings in the case and the
often sparse conclusions of the circuit court.184 This may make it diffi-
cult for the appellate court to identify with reliability and accuracy
errors made by the lower court.
Furthermore, as with other discretionary decisions, like those on
certiorari, a decision to deny leave to appeal in a postconviction case
may reflect a variety of judgments unrelated to the merits of the is-
sues, and once the Court of Special Appeals has exercised its discre-
182. Act of April 8, 1965, ch. 442, § 645A(b), 1965 Md. Laws 634, 635 (emphasis reflects
new language). The comparable provision today is in Mo. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 7-
106(a) (1), which provides: "For the purposes of this title, an allegation of error is finally
litigated when: (1) an appellate court of the State decides on the merits of the allegation:
(i) on direct appeal; or (ii) on any consideration of an application for leave to appeal filed
under [the Act]."
183. In Hadder v. Warden, the Court of Special Appeals held, consistent with the plain
meaning of the text of section 645A(b), that when a postconviction petitioner lost, but did
not seek leave to appeal, the claims in that proceeding had not been "finally litigated." 7
Md. App. 584, 587, 256 A.2d 549, 551 (1969). Reciting the language of section 645A(b),
the court said that "a contention cannot be deemed to have been 'finally litigated' where
there has been no decision on the merits thereof by the Court of Appeals or this Court
either upon direct appeal or upon consideration for leave to appeal." Id.; accord Sample v.
Warden, 6 Md. App. 103, 106-07, 250 A.2d 269, 271 (1969).
184. MD. R. 8-204(c).
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fion, and denied leave to appeal, the Court of Appeals has no
jurisdiction to review that decision.'85
h. Waivers of Claims and Exceptions to Waiver.-In overview
form, there is "a two-tier waiver rule that is part statutory and part
common law."' 86
The first tier includes claims based on rights that are "fundamen-
tal.""8 7 The waiver rule for this tier is found in the Act. Under the
text of the Act, a petitioner has waived a claim when that petitioner
"could have made but intelligently and knowingly failed to make the
allegation" in a prior proceeding.'88 Before this text was interpreted
by the Maryland Court of Appeals, it appeared to mean that absent an
informed and personal waiver by the petitioner, all claims were pre-
served. As interpreted, however, the "intelligently and knowingly" re-
quirement applies only to claims based on a limited category of
"fundamental rights."' 89 These rights include those "for which the
United States Supreme Court has required an express, knowing, and
intelligent waiver. " 19
The second-tier rules-those governing the waiver of claims
based on nonfundamental rights-are to be found outside the Act, in
"case law or any pertinent statutes or rules." '' These rules generally
provide that actions and omissions of the lawyer bind the client, in-
cluding procedural defaults.' 92
I now turn to the history of the waiver rules and a more detailed
discussion of these two-tier rules, including the exceptions to waiver.
The original Act precluded a petitioner from asserting an error
that had been "waived in the proceedings resulting in the conviction,
or in any other proceeding that the petitioner has taken to secure
relief from his conviction."'9 3 The Act did not define "waived."
In 1965, the General Assembly substantially revised the waiver
provision'" in response to the Supreme Court's decision in Fay v.
185. CRIM. PROC. § 7-109(b) (4).
186. Baker v. Corcoran, 220 F.3d 276, 289 (4th Cir. 2000).
187. Id. at 289-90.
188. CRIM. PROC. § 7-106(b)(1)(i).
189. Curtis v. State, 284 Md. 132, 149, 395 A.2d 464, 474 (1978).
190. Baker, 220 F.3d at 290 (citing McElroy v. State, 329 Md. 136, 139-40, 617 A.2d 1068,
1070 (1993)); see infra Part III.C.l.h(2).
191. Curtis, 284 Md. at 149-50, 395 A.2d at 474.
192. See infra Part III.C.l.h(2).
193. Act of April 4, 1958, ch. 44, § 645A(a), 1958 Md. Laws 178, 179.
194. Act of April 8, 1965, ch. 442, § 645A(c), 1965 Md. Laws 634, 635.
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Noia.'9 5 In Fay, the Court addressed "under what circumstances, if
any, the failure of a state prisoner to comply with a state procedural
requirement, as a result of which the state courts decline to pass on
the merits of his federal defense, bars subsequent resort to the federal
courts for relief on habeas corpus."'1 96 The Court held that a federal
court had "limited discretion" to deny habeas relief to an applicant,
but only to one "who has deliberately by-passed the orderly procedure
of the state courts and in so doing has forfeited his state court reme-
dies." '19 7 The Court said: "The classic definition of waiver enunciated
in Johnson v. Zerbst-'an intentional relinquishment or abandonment
of a known right or privilege'-furnishes the controlling standard.""'
The Court emphasized that, in order to satisfy the waiver standard, it
must be the petitioner who, "after consultation with competent counsel
or otherwise, understandingly and knowingly forewent the privilege of
seeking to vindicate his federal claims in the state courts, whether for
strategic, tactical, or any other reasons that can fairly be described as
the deliberate by-passing of state procedures." '9 9 Therefore, "[a]
choice made by counsel not participated in by the petitioner does not
automatically bar relief. Nor does a state court's finding of waiver bar
independent determination of the question by the federal courts on
habeas, for waiver affecting federal rights is a federal question. '"200
The 1965 amendments to the Act had four basic components.
First, they incorporated the Johnson v. Zerbst standard: "[A] n allegation
of error shall be deemed to be waived when a petitioner could have
made, but intelligently and knowingly failed to make, such allegation"
in prior proceedings.2 °1
Second, they created a rebuttable presumption that if "an allega-
tion of error could have been made by a petitioner" in a prior pro-
195. 372 U.S. 391 (1963). The legislative purpose underlying these revisions by the
General Assembly was "to adopt the concept of 'waiver' set forth by the Supreme Court in
cases like Johnson v. Zerbst and Fay v. Noia." Curtis, 284 Md. at 142, 395 A.2d at 470 (cita-
tions omitted). The votes on the final bill, H.B. 901, were unanimous in both the House of
Delegates (117-0) and Senate (29-0). See 1965 MD. HOUSEJOURNAL 1655; 1965 MD. SENATE
JOURNAL 1559.
196. Fay, 372 U.S. at 399.
197. Id. at 438.
198. Id. at 439 (citingJohnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).
199. Id.
200. Id. Subsequent to Fay, the Supreme Court, in Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72
(1977), and Congress, see supra Part II.B, abandoned the Fay waiver standard.
201. Act of April 8, 1965, ch. 442, § 645A(c), 1965 Md. Laws 634, 635. The prior pro-
ceedings were "before trial, at trial, on direct appeal (whether or not said petitioner actu-
ally took such an appeal), in any habeas corpus or coram nobis proceeding actually
instituted by said petitioner, in a prior petition under this subtitle, or in any other proceed-
ing actually instituted by said petitioner." Id.
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ceeding, "but was not in fact so made," the "petitioner intelligently
and knowingly failed to make such allegation."2 °2
Third, they added a forgiveness provision, authorizing a court to
excuse a waiver and resolve a claim on the merits if the petitioner
proves the existence of special circumstances.20 3
Fourth, they added a broad exception to both the waiver and "fi-
nally litigated" provisions for new constitutional standards developed
by the Supreme Court or either of Maryland's appellate courts, which
apply "retrospectively" and "affect the validity of the petitioner's con-
"1204viction or sentence.
With largely nonsubstantive changes, these provisions remain in
effect today.205 The judicial interpretations of these rules, however,
have added important glosses to the legislative text.
(1) Limiting the Statutory Waiver Definition to Claims Based on
Fundamental Rights.-In 1978, in Curtis v. State,20 6 the Court of Appeals
held that the 1965 amendments defining "waiver" applied only to
claims based on "certain basic constitutional rights under circum-
stances where the courts have held that only such intelligent and
knowing action will bind the defendant."20 7 To waive a claim based
on such a fundamental right, petitioners themselves must intelligently
and knowingly relinquish the claim in an on-the-record proceed-
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. § 645A(d), 1965 Md. Laws at 635.
205. See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC., § 7-106 (2004). To reflect changes in Maryland
criminal procedure, the current law has added to the proceedings in which a petitioner
might have waived a claim, "an application for leave to appeal a conviction based on a
guilty plea." Id. § 7-106(b)(1)(i) (4).
206. 284 Md. 132, 395 A.2d 464 (1978).
207. Id. at 148, 395 A.2d at 473. Curtis had filed a second postconviction petition in
which, for the first time, he argued that he had received constitutionally ineffective assis-
tance of counsel from his trial, appellate, and first postconviction lawyers. Id at 134, 395
A.2d at 466. The parties stipulated that Curtis had "a seventh grade education and an l.Q.
of 72 (borderline range of intelligence)"; that there was evidence that he "was a chronic
alcoholic who had suffered some brain damage as a result of extended drinking for
nineteen (19) years"; that he "relied entirely on his court-appointed counsel at trial, on
direct appeal ... and in his first post-conviction case"; and that he "would have raised the
issue of ineffective assistance of counsel in his prior post-conviction case had [he] known
that there was a possible issue of ineffective assistance of counsel." Id. at 136, 395 A.2d at
467. The Court of Special Appeals held that Curtis had waived the argument that trial
counsel was ineffective by failing to assert it in his first postconviction proceeding and had
not proved either that his first postconviction lawyer was ineffective or that there were
special circumstances to excuse the waiver. Id. at 137, 395 A.2d at 467.
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ing.20 8 The "failure of counsel or an unknowing petitioner to raise
[such] an issue" is not a "waiver."2 °9
The court held that Curtis's claim, based on the Sixth Amend-
ment right to the effective assistance of counsel, is a first-tier claim
and therefore "is governed by the Johnson v. Zerbst standard of an 'in-
telligent and knowing' waiver." 210  The statutory presumption of
waiver, the court said, "can be rebutted by evidence or stipulated facts
showing that petitioner did not 'intelligently and knowingly' fail to
raise the issue previously. ' 211 The facts rebutted the presumption in
Curtis's case; he was therefore allowed to assert his claims.
The court adopted its two-tier approach from a line of Supreme
Court decisions in which the court sometimes applied the Johnson v.
Zerbst and Fay v. Noia waiver standards, and sometimes did not, "de-
pend [ing] upon the nature of the right and the surrounding circum-
stances" in each case. 21 2 The court concluded that the Maryland
General Assembly "intended that the [section 645A(c)] waiver provi-
sion . . . , with its express definition of waiver, be applicable only in
those situations where the courts have required an 'intelligent and
knowing' standard."2 3 To hold otherwise, the opinion said, would
mean that
every time counsel made a tactical decision or a procedural
default occurred, the result could be chaotic. For example,
under such an interpretation of the statute, for a criminal
defendant to be bound by his lawyer's actions, the lawyer
would have to interrupt a trial repeatedly and go through
countless litanies with his client.2" 4
In Wyche v. State,2 15 the Court of Special Appeals said: "Funda-
mental rights [within the meaning of the PCPA] have been defined as
208. In Wyche v. State, the court set forth a two-prong test for finding an "intelligent" and
"knowing" waiver: "1. The record expressly reflects that the defendant had a basic under-
standing of the nature of the right which was relinquished or abandoned; and 2. The
record expressly reflects acknowledgement that the relinquishment or abandonment of
that right was made or agreed to by the defendant." 53 Md. App. 403, 406, 454 A.2d 378,
379 (1983).
209. Curtis, 284 Md. at 139, 395 A.2d at 469. The Curtis opinion said that "the standard
of 'waiver' for purposes of the Act is whether 'the petitioner himself "intelligently and
knowingly" failed to raise the issue' or, stated another way, whether he was previously
aware of and understood the possible defense.'" Id. at 140, 395 A.2d at 469.
210. Id. at 150, 395 A.2d at 474.
211. Id. at 139, 395 A.2d at 469.
212. Id. at 147, 395 A.2d at 473.
213. Id. at 148, 395 A.2d at 473.
214. Id. at 149, 395 A.2d at 474.
215. 53 Md. App. 403, 454 A.2d 378 (1983).
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being, almost without exception, basic rights of a constitutional ori-
gin, whether federal or state, that have been guaranteed to a criminal
defendant in order to preserve a fair trial and the reliability of the
truth-determining process."2" 6 The court's list of "rights that have
been deemed fundamental" included
the right to counsel, the right to trial by jury, the right to be
properly advised before the acceptance of a guilty plea, the
right not to be compelled to give self-incriminating evidence,
the right against double jeopardy, the right to confrontation,
the right to a speedy trial, and the right to counsel at a post
indictment pre-trial line up, as well as "the right to effective
assistance of counsel at a criminal trial."
2 17
Even if petitioner has personally-and knowingly and intelli-
gently-waived a claim based on a fundamental right, a court can ex-
cuse that waiver if the petitioner demonstrates "special circumstances"
for excuse. 218 This is, however, a separate, second step in the analysis,
as the court in Curtis emphasized: "Where the record affirmatively
shows that there was not an intelligent and knowing failure to raise
[the issue], there is nothing to 'excuse,' and the presence or absence
of 'special circumstances' has no relevance."219
(2) The Waiver Rules That Apply to Claims Based on Rights
That Are Not Fundamental, and the Exceptions to These Rules.-The Court
of Appeals in Curtis said that these second-tier claims are "to be gov-
erned by case law or any pertinent statutes or rules,"22' and added:
"Tactical decisions, when made by an authorized competent attorney,
as well as legitimate procedural requirements, will normally bind a
criminal defendant."221 Maryland's appellate courts have spent sev-
216. Id. at 406, 454 A.2d at 380.
217. I& (citations omitted). The court in Wyche apparently included in its reference to
the right of confrontation the right recognized in Williams v. State, 292 Md. 201, 438 A.2d
1301 (1981), of criminal defendants to be present at every stage of their trial, including at
a bench conference at which voir dire is conducted or a venire panel juror is excused.
Wyche, 53 Md. App. at 408, 454 A.2d at 380-81. The Court of Appeals said this right "is a
common law right, is to some extent protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, and is guaranteed by Maryland Rule 724." Williams, 292 Md. at
211, 438 A.2d at 1306.
218. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. §7-106 (b) (1) (ii) (2004).
219. Curtis, 284 Md. at 139, 395 A.2d at 468.
220. I& at 149-50, 395 A.2d at 474.
221. Id. at 150, 395 A.2d at 474.
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eral decades trying to identify the exceptions to these general waiver
principles.22
In Walker v. State,22 1 the Court of Appeals summarized its prior
decisions by stating that "a court, in a post conviction proceeding, can
excuse a waiver [of a nonfundamental right] based upon an earlier
procedural default if the circumstances warrant such action.'2 24 Walker
had alleged, in his third postconviction petition, "that the trial court
incorrectly instructed the jury that an intent to inflict severe injury was
sufficient to support a conviction for assault with intent to murder,
and that this error permitted the State to obtain his conviction with-
out proving every element of the offense beyond a reasonable
doubt. '2 25  His trial lawyer, however, had not objected to the
instruction.
To overcome this procedural default, and his failures to chal-
lenge the instruction in his prior proceedings, Walker argued that the
waiver issue was governed by section 645A(c) .226 The opinion recog-
nized that the rules that authorize "a court to take cognizance of
'plain error' despite the waiver of an issue, literally apply only to direct
appellate review of a judgment."227 The Court of Appeals also ac-
knowledged that "the similar 'special circumstances"' exception to
waiver, "set forth in [the PCPA] ," applies only to "situations requiring
intelligent and knowing action before there is a waiver," i.e., waivers of
fundamental rights claims.228
The court, nevertheless, said that "[i] n effect, we have upheld the
application of the 'plain error' or 'special circumstances' principles to
222. See Cirincione v. State, 119 Md. App. 471, 512-17, 705 A.2d 96, 116-18 (1998) (sur-
veying the applicable case law).
223. 343 Md. 629, 684 A.2d 429 (1996).
224. Id. at 647-48, 684 A.2d at 438 (emphasis added); accord Oken v. State, 343 Md. 256,
273, 681 A.2d 30, 38 (1996) ("this Court retains discretion to excuse waiver" at a postcon-
viction proceeding).
225. Walker, 343 Md. at 633, 684 A.2d at 431.
226. See id. at 635, 684 A.2d at 432 (noting the circuit court's application of the "know-
ing and intelligent waiver" and the "special circumstances" standards). The circuit court
excused the waivers, finding both "plain error" and "special circumstances." Id. The spe-
cial circumstances were that "at the time of Walker's trial, the law concerning the intent
element of assault with intent to murder was misunderstood by trial judges and lawyers,
and that the law was not finally clarified until . . . more than five years after Walker's
conviction became final." Id. The circuit court also found that Walker had a fundamental
ight to the proper instruction, which he had not personally, knowingly, and intelligently
waived. Id. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument, reiterating that "the failure to
object to or otherwise challenge a jury instruction constitutes a waiver of the issue for
purposes of the Maryland Post Conviction Procedure Act." Id. at 645, 684 A.2d at 437.
227. Id. at 647, 684 A.2d at 438 (referring to MD. R. 4-325(e), 8-131 (a)).
228. Id.
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waivers of [nonfundamental rights]."229 Although the Court of Ap-
peals held that Walker could assert these exceptions to waiver on post-
conviction, it found that the principles were inapplicable to the
circumstances of his case.23 °
In sum, the "plain error" exception to waiver is applicable in post-
conviction cases, as is the "special circumstances" exception. Al-
though the latter exception is not as well-developed as the former,23'
the Court of Appeals has said that "special circumstances" may exist
when defense counsel fails to preserve error because of a "misconcep-
tion by a large segment of the bench and the bar" about the gov-
erning law.232
In addition to the "plain error" and "special circumstances" ex-
ceptions to waiver, there are two other "exceptions," broadly con-
ceived, to the waiver of claims based on both fundamental and
nonfundamental rights: (1) the PCPA provision that gives petitioners
the benefit of new constitutional standards announced by the Su-
preme Court or a Maryland appellate court and applied retroac-
229. Id. at 648, 684 A.2d at 438.
230. Id. at 650, 684 A.2d at 439.
231. See, e.g., Richmond v. State, 330 Md. 223, 237, 623 A.2d 632, 636 (1993) (holding
that it was plain error to fail to instruct jury that the prosecution was required to prove
specific intent); Squire v. State, 280 Md. 132, 135-36, 368 A.2d 1019, 1020-21 (1977) (hold-
ing that a change in law due to an intervening Supreme Court decision justified use of the
plain error doctrine to review a constitutionally deficient instruction); State v. Evans, 278
Md. 197, 211-12, 362 A.2d 629, 637-38 (1976) (same); Brooks v. State, 68 Md. App. 604,
613-14, 515 A.2d 225, 230-31 (1986) (finding plain error in a jury instruction allowing
reckless or wanton disregard to satisfy the mens rea requirement for conviction for mali-
cious destruction of property).
232. Walker, 343 Md. at 648, 684 A.2d at 438. The Court of Appeals explained in Walker
that it had held in Franklin v. State, 319 Md. 116, 511 A.2d 1208 (1990), that the failure to
object to an erroneous jury instruction should be excused because of the "misconception
by a large segment of the bench and the bar concerning the intent element of assault with
intent to murder." Walker, 343 Md. at 648, 684 A.2d at 438. The Walker opinion noted that
the lower court had "held that this same misconception should excuse the failure to object
at Walker's trial." Id. It said: "We assume that, if the circumstances in the present case
were similar to those in Franklin, the circuit court's decision excusing Walker's waiver of
the jury instruction issue would have been warranted. The circumstances in the two cases,
however, were not at all comparable." Id. at 648-49, 684 A.2d at 438; see also Parker v. State,
4 Md. App. 62, 67, 241 A.2d 185, 188 (1968) (holding that waiver should be excused be-
cause appellant's failure to object to an erroneous instruction was neither "a bad guess
[n]or a trial tactic but resulted rather from a misunderstanding of the applicable law-a
misunderstanding also shared by the court, and by the State"). But see Hunt v. State, 345
Md. 122, 151-52, 691 A.2d 1255, 1269 (1997) (finding that there had been no change in
law that excused the failure of counsel to preserve a legal argument); Oken v. State, 343
Md. 256, 272-73, 681 A.2d 30, 38 (1996) (noting that the law was clearly established at the
time that counsel failed to object to jury voir dire, and counsel deliberately failed to raise
the matter on appeal as a tactical matter).
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 64:968
tively,2"3 and (2) demonstration that counsel provided constitutionally
ineffective assistance (which allows the petitioner then to assert the
underlying claim) .34
IV. IMPORTANT ISSUES UNDER THE PCPA
A. Whether the PCPA Authorizes a Court to Order Discovery
There is uncertainty about whether, and the extent to which, a
court may authorize parties to conduct discovery in postconviction
cases. If one traces the current governing rule to its source, however,
it appears that at a minimum, a court has discretion to order limited
discovery, especially by deposition.
Maryland Rule 4-406 grants courts broad discretion in con-
ducting evidentiary hearings and structuring the rules that govern
them. The rule states: "Evidence may be presented by affidavit, depo-
sition, oral testimony, or in any other form as the court finds conve-
nient and just. In the interest of justice, the court may decline to
require strict application of the rules in Title 5, except those relating
to the competency of witnesses. 23 5
The authorization to accept evidence "in any other form as the
court finds convenient and just" is a particularly broad grant of
discretion.
233. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 7-106(c) (2004).
234. Criminal defendants have a constitutional right to the effective assistance of coun-
sel at trial, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) ("[T he right to counsel is
the right to the effective assistance of counsel." (quoting McCann v. Richardson, 397 U.S.
759, 771 n.14 (1970))), and on appeal, Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396 (1985) ("A first
appeal as of fight.., is not adjudicated in accord with due process of law if the appellant
does not have the effective assistance of an attorney."); Wilson v. State, 284 Md. 664, 671,
399 A.2d 256, 260 (1979) ("Entitlement to assistance of counsel [on appeal] would be
hollow indeed unless the assistance were required to be effective."). In Maryland, postcon-
viction petitioners have a statutory right to counsel, which includes effective assistance.
Section 7-108 of the Criminal Procedure Article provides that right, and section 4(b) (3) of
Article 27A of the Maryland Code incorporates that fight into the Maryland Public De-
fender Act. "[R]egardless of the source, the fight to counsel means the right to the effec-
tive assistance of counsel." State v. Flansburg, 345 Md. 694, 703, 694 A.2d 462, 467 (1997).
In Stovall v. State, the court said: "A defendant has a broader right to counsel under the
Maryland Public Defender Act than under the United States Constitution." 144 Md. App.
711, 721, 800 A.2d 31, 37 (2002). It cited McCarter v. State, 363 Md. 705, 713, 770 A.2d 195,
199 (2001), and Fansburg, 345 Md. at 700, 694 A.2d at 465.
235. MD. R. 4-406(c). Title 5 contains rules of evidence.
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The initial version of the PCPA, as enacted in 1958, included the
substance of the above-quoted provision.236 That provision, in turn,
came verbatim from section 7 of the UPCPA.
237
The qualified right to conduct discovery is implied from the par-
ties' right to present evidence by "deposition" and "in any other form as
the court finds convenient and just."23 8 The parties must be able to
create those forms of evidence in the first instance. Without at least
limited forms of discovery, the parties would not be able to do so.
It is a novel issue in Maryland whether 4-406(c) authorizes a court
to order limited discovery, but appellate courts in other states have
found that provisions like Rule 4-406(c) authorize postconviction
courts to do so.
2 39
It might be argued that Rule 4-406(c) only permits courts to admit
depositions, but not to order that depositions be taken, and similarly,
only to admit "other form [s]" of existing evidence, "as the court finds
convenient and just," but not to issue orders that allow the parties to
obtain and create these forms of evidence. Or, it might be contended
that the rule only allows parties to take depositions to perpetuate testi-
mony. There are serious problems with these arguments, however.
First, neither Rule 4-406, nor the commentary to it, contains any
such limitations.
Moreover, the admit-but-not-take-deposition argument would
render the "deposition" provision a virtual nullity.2 40 It is the rare
criminal case in Maryland in which a party takes a deposition.241
236. Section 645G of the original Act provided: "The court may receive proof by affida-
vits, depositions, oral testimony, or other evidence, and may order the petitioner brought
before it for the hearing." Act of April 4, 1958, ch. 44, § 645G, 1958 Md. Laws 178, 181.
237. UNIF. PosT-CoNVcrION PROCEDURE Acr, llA U.L.A. 267, 268 (1995).
238. Mo. R. 4-406(c).
239. See Gollehon v. State, 986 P.2d 395 (Mont. 1999) (applying MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-
21-201(5), which authorizes admission of depositions in postconviction proceedings, and
noting both a prior court order requiring discovery and that the parties took discovery
depositions to comply with it); see also State v. Wright, 42 P.3d 753, 758 (Mont. 2001) (ap-
plying section 46-21-201(5) and reciting that the deposition had been taken and admitted
into evidence and holding that strict compliance with deposition rules of civil procedure is
not required in postconviction cases).
240. See State v. Pagano, 341 Md. 129, 134, 669 A.2d 1339, 1341 (1996) (noting that the
court interprets statutes "so that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered surplus-
age, superfluous, meaningless, or nugatory"); Stanley v. State, 157 Md. App. 363, 378, 851
A.2d 612, 620 (2004) (noting that courts "should construe the statute in a manner that
results in an interpretation reasonable and consonant with logic and common sense" (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted)).
241. MD. R. 4-261 (b) authorizes a party in a criminal case to take a pretrial deposition
only if the parties agree to do so ("subject to the right of the witness to move for a protec-
tive order") or "the court, on motion of a party, .. . order[s] that the testimony of a witness
be taken by deposition if satisfied that the witness may be unable to attend a trial or hear-
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
Therefore, unless the postconviction judge orders that a deposition be
taken, there will be no deposition to admit into evidence at the post-
conviction proceeding. This argument also ignores the nature of the
postconviction process, which protects rights of convicted defendants
based on evidence outside of the trial and appellate record, not within
it, as a preexisting deposition would be.
Both arguments also ignore the central purpose of Rule 4-406(c),
which is to allow the parties to efficiently and effectively prepare, as well
as present, evidence and to allow the court to efficiently control the
hearings that it holds.
Finally, the history of the rule supports the limited-discovery in-
terpretation of it. The Court of Appeals adopted Rule 4-406(c) in
1984, thereby transferring the "deposition" provision from one Mary-
land Rule, Rule BK 44(d), to another, 4-406(c). Before the transfer,
Rule 1000 made the civil discovery rules applicable to Chapter 1100
proceedings, including postconviction proceedings. The Court of Ap-
peals in State v. Giles242 explained:
With respect to the authority of the appellees [postconvic-
tion petitioners] to take depositions in a proceeding of this
nature, the lower court found that proceedings under the
P.C.P.A. are civil in nature and that the rules relating to civil
proceedings are applicable to them. The rules governing
post conviction procedure are to be found in Rules BK40
through BK48 in Chapter 1100 titled "Special Proceedings"
and not under Chapter 700 dealing with procedure in
"Criminal Causes." And Rule 1000 titled "Special Proceed-
ings-General Rules Applicable" provides that "the preceding
Rules, Chapters 1, 100 to 600 inclusive and 800 are applica-
ble to Special Proceedings dealt with in Chapter 1100, ex-
cept insofar as the Rules contained in Chapter 1100
otherwise provide expressly or by necessary implication." Re-
gardless therefore of whether the rules governing post con-
viction proceedings are civil in nature, there seems to be
little doubt, since Rule 1000, providing that Chapter 400(Depositions and Discovery) is applicable to Chapter 1100(Special Proceedings), that the authorization to take deposi-
ing, that the testimony may be material, and that the taking of the deposition is necessary
to prevent a failure of justice." MD. R. 4-261(b). If the Maryland Court of Appeals had
meant to limit the depositions admissible in postconviction proceedings to those taken in
pretrial criminal proceedings, it most likely would have added a cross-reference to Mary-
land Rule 4-261 in Rule 4-406 or the commentary to it, or said something about this al-
leged intent. It did neither.
242. 239 Md. 458, 212 A.2d 101 (1965).
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tions in post conviction proceedings was proper, and we so
hold.243
In State v. Bundy,2 41 the Court of Special Appeals reiterated the
then-accepted rule that "a post conviction proceeding is deemed to be
civil in nature," and therefore "the rules relating to civil proceedings
are applicable to post conviction proceedings."245
Shortly after Bundy was decided, an assistant attorney general pro-
posed to the Court of Appeals Standing Committee on Rules of Prac-
tice and Procedure that the evidentiary provision be transferred to the
criminal rules. When asked why the "post conviction procedure rules
are being placed in the criminal title, rather than in the civil title," he
offered a "housekeeping" response: "The Post Conviction Act is part
of the criminal article of the Code and the applicable procedure was
part of the criminal article [referring to the PCPA] until the BK Rules
were adopted, at which time the procedure was deleted from the
code." '24 6 A Committee member, Paul Niemeyer,247 asked whether
"the civil discovery rules apply" to postconviction proceedings (one
option), or whether "a deposition is permitted only by leave of court"
(a second option) .248 He then recommended language that would
have precluded the first, but only the first, option. 249 The Rules Com-
mittee, however, rejected that proposal. 250 This is not surprising
given that several members of the Committee, as well as the Reporter,
either thought postconviction proceedings were, and should remain,
civil proceedings; or were not sure whether they were civil or
criminal.2
51
Although one could argue from this history that the transfer of
the provision from the civil to the criminal rules means that the rules
of civil discovery do not generally apply to postconviction proceedings,
243. Id. at 467-68, 212 A.2d at 107.
244. 52 Md. App. 456, 450 A.2d 495 (1982).
245. Id. at 459 n.2, 450 A.2d at 497 n.2 (citing Gies, 239 Md. at 467-68, 212 A.2d at 107);
see also Carder v. Warden, 3 Md. App. 309, 239 A.2d 143 (1968) (holding that a postconvic-
tion judge acted within his authority in limiting scope of relief to appellate review of peti-
tioner's criminal conviction).
246. Minutes of Meeting, Maryland Court of Appeals Standing Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure 90 (Oct. 15-16, 1982) [hereinafter Rules Committee Hearing
Notes].
247. Now a judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
248. Rules Committee Hearing Notes, supra note 246, at 90.
249. He suggested amending the second sentence of Maryland Rule 1-101 to read: "Ti-
tle 2," which includes the civil rules of discovery, "applies to civil matters in the circuit
courts, except postconviction procedures." Id. at 91.
250. See MD. R. 1-101 (b) (providing for the application of Title 2 to civil matters in the
circuit courts).
251. See Rules Committee Hearing Notes, supra note 246, at 90-91.
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the Rules Committee's discussions and decisions, as well as the history,
text, and purpose of Rule 4 -406(c), support the conclusion that the
drafters intended, at a minimum, to vest postconviction courts with
discretion to order limited discovery if the circumstances warrant it.
B. The Meaning of the "Interests of Justice" Reopening Standard
When, in 1995, the General Assembly reduced from two to one
the number of postconviction petitions that a petitioner can file,2 52 it
also authorized courts to "reopen a postconviction proceeding that
was previously concluded if the court determines that the action is in
the interests of justice."2 5' Although the General Assembly did not
define "interests of justice," the Court of Special Appeals has read it
broadly, as the General Assembly intended. The Court has said that
[a] lthough the phrase "in the interests of justice," as used in[the PCPA] has not been defined, we have considered its
meaning in the context of a motion for a new trial under
Maryland Rule 4-331, the granting of which is also within the
discretion of the circuit court .... [T] he grounds "for the
granting of a new trial... [are] virtually open-ended .... "254
Speaking of a motion for new trial, the court said: "In Isley v. State, we
commented that 'there are no limits on the substantive content of
252. Act of April 11, 1995, ch. 110, § 645A(a) (2), 1995 Md. Laws 1473, 1482 (codified as
amended at MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 7-103(a) (2004)).
253. Id (codified as amended at CRuM. PROC. § 7-104). In Gray v. State, the court com-
pared a motion to reopen with an original proceeding:
[A] person is entitled, as a matter of right, to file one postconviction petition.
The reopening of a closed postconviction proceeding, however, is at the discre-
tion of the circuit court.
Also, as a matter of right, a person filing a petition for postconviction relief is
entitled to a hearing and the assistance of counsel. A request that a postconvic-
tion proceeding be reopened does not entitle a person to either. Under the stat-
ute, the circuit court determines if a hearing and the assistance of counsel
"should be granted." Md. Rule 4 -406(a) provides that, in the absence of a stipula-
tion that the applicable facts and law justify the requested relief, the circuit court
may not reopen a proceeding or grant relief without a hearing, but a request to
reopen can be denied without a hearing.
158 Md. App. 635, 645, 857 A.2d 1176, 1181-82 (2004) (citations omitted).
254. Gray, 158 Md. App. at 646 n.3, 857 A.2d at 1182 n.3. The court said these grounds
"includ[e] the following: 'that the verdict was contrary to the evidence; newly discovered
evidence; accident and surprise; misconduct ofjurors or the officer having them in charge;
bias and disqualification ofjurors... ; misconduct or error of the judge; fraud or miscon-
duct of the prosecution.'" Id. The court added: "We also explained that a new trial could
be granted if the evidence was legally insufficient or the verdict was 'so against the weight
of the evidence as to constitute a miscarriage ofjustice.'" Id. (quoting Love v. State, 95 Md.
App. 420, 427, 621 A.2d 910, 914 (1993)).
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what may be urged . . . as being "in the interest of justice."'
2 55
Whatever limits there should be on the scope of judicial discretion to
act in the interests of justice are to be found in "the statutory con-
straints of the [PCPA] and the type of claims to which it affords a
remedy. "256
This broad interpretation of the "interests of justice" standard is
wholly consistent with both the flexible common understanding of the
word 'Justice" and the legislative history of the clause. It was adopted
as an amendment to Senate Bill 340, which contained the one-peti-
tion-only provision. 257 The Office of Public Defender proposed the
"interests ofjustice" amendment in lieu of the original "miscarriage of
justice" standard,258 which the Office argued was "insurmountable
federal language,"259 and the amendment became known as the "Pub-
lic Defender Amendment."26" The Governor's Commission on the
Death Penalty, which issued its report in November 1993, had recom-
mended both the one-petition limitation and the "miscarriage of jus-
tice" reopening standard.261' The Commission explained that
establishing a standard for reopening postconviction proceedings was
a "difficult issue." 26 2 It offered as examples of its "miscarriage" stan-
255. Id. (quoting Isley v. State, 129 Md. App. 611, 633, 743 A.2d 772, 784 (2000)).
256. Id.
257. The following was the text of the amendment and deleted language (with original
statutory language in regular text, deleted language in brackets, bill provisions in capital
letters, and the amendment in italicized, capital letters):
SECTION 1:
645A
(a) (1).
(2) (I) A person may [not file more than 2 petitions] FILE ONLY ONE PETI-
TION, arising out of each trial, for relief under this subtitle.
(II) THE COURT MAY IN ITS DISCRETION REOPEN A POST CONVIC-
TION PROCEEDING THAT WAS PREVIOUSLY CONCLUDED IF THE COURT
DETERMINES THAT SUCH ACTION IS IN ThE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE.
S.B. 340, 1995 Leg., 409th Sess. (Md. 1995).
258. Proposed Public Defender Amendments to S.B. 340, Amendment 1 (Feb. 28, 1995)
(available in the legislative reference file, S.B. 340).
259. Id (statement of George Lipman, now a judge in the District Court of Maryland,
Baltimore City).
260. See id.
261. GOVERNOR'S COMM'N ON THE DEATH PENALTY, AN ANALYSIS OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
IN MARYLAND: 1978-1993, at xxiii (1993). In its "Recommendation 17," captioned "Elimi-
nation of Second Postconviction Petition," the Commission said: "The legislature should
amend section 645A of Article 27 to eliminate the right of a defendant to file a second
postconviction petition. The amendment should also provide that the postconviction court
may reopen a proceeding only if a reopening is necessary to avoid a miscarriage ofjustice."
Id
262. Id. at 258.
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dard, which it took from Supreme Court decisions, "new law claims,
i.e., claims based on judicial decisions subsequent to the initial post-
conviction proceeding," and claims that "a constitutional violation has
caused the conviction of one innocent of a crime. 263
The rejection of the "miscarriage of justice" standard and its uni-
versally accepted meaning, and adoption of the "interests of justice"
standard expressed the General Assembly's clear intention that courts
would consider a variety of factors, in addition to persuasive claims of
innocence and newly announced legal rules, to determine whether to
reopen a prior postconviction proceeding.
C. Potential Applications of the "Interests of Justice" Standard, in Tandem
with the "Special Circumstances" Exception to Waiver
1. Mandatory Reopenings.-
a. When Postconviction Counsel Provides Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel to the Petitioner.-The Court of Special Appeals has said:
"There is no entitlement to have a closed postconviction proceeding
reopened unless the petitioner asserts facts that, 'if proven to be true
at a subsequent hearing[] establish that postconviction relief would
have been granted but for the ineffective assistance of. . . postconvic-
tion counsel.' ",264 Put affirmatively, there is an entitlement to reopen
if a petitioner can prove both prongs of the ineffective assistance of
counsel test.
First, the petitioner must prove "that [postconviction] counsel's
performance was deficient. ' 265 To do this, the petitioner "must (1)
demonstrate that counsel's acts or omissions, given the circumstances,
'fell below an objective standard of reasonableness considering pre-
263. Id at 258-59. As the Commission indicated, prior to 1995, the federal judiciary had
given the "miscarriage of justice" standard a restrictive interpretation in habeas corpus
cases, limiting it to claims of innocence. See McClesky v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494-95 (1991)
(applying a "miscarriage ofjustice" standard that required an innocent man's conviction).
In fact, during the General Assembly's consideration of S.B. 340, the Supreme Court reiter-
ated this principle in Schlup v. Delo, holding that a "fundamental miscarriage of justice"
occurs when a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who
is actually innocent. 513 U.S. 298, 315-17 (1995) (discussing Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S.
390, 404 (1993)).
264. Harris v. State, 160 Md. App. 78, 97, 862 A.2d 516, 527 (2004) (emphasis added);
see Tomlinson, supra note 5, at 965 (arguing, prior to Stovall, that the ineffectiveness of
postconviction counsel is a compelling ground to reopen a postconviction proceeding).
265. Gross v. State, 371 Md. 334, 349, 809 A.2d 627, 635 (2002) (quoting Oken v. State,
343 Md. 256, 283, 681 A.2d 30, 43 (1996)).
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vailing professional norms,' and (2) overcome the presumption that
the challenged conduct 'be considered sound trial strategy.' "266
Second, the petitioner must show that that counsel's "deficient
performance prejudiced the defense." '267 This means, "putting aside
those few situations in which prejudice is presumed (actual or con-
structive denial of counsel and actual conflict of interest), the defen-
dant must show that the particular and unreasonable errors of
counsel 'actually had an adverse effect on the defense.'" 268 This re-
quires more proof than that "the errors had some conceivable effect
on the outcome of the proceedings. . . " but less than "that counsel's
deficient conduct more likely than not altered the outcome in the
case." 269 The test is whether there is a "substantial possibility" that
counsel's errors altered the outcome in the case.27°
If both these tests are satisfied, the court must reopen the prior
proceeding and grant appropriate relief.
b. Retroactive Applications of New Standards.-There is at least
one other ground that entitles a petitioner to reopen. It is, pursuant to
section 7-106(c) that a new, binding and retroactive standard in the
petitioner's case when it would "affect the validity of the petitioner's
conviction or sentence."2 l7 By the express terms of the provision,
claims based on such new standards, "[niotwithstanding any other
provision of' the PCPA, "may not be considered to have been finally
litigated or waived."272 This is a legislatively prescribed, mandatory
reopening provision.
2. Discretionary Reopenings.-In this Section, I combine discus-
sion of the "interests ofjustice" and "special circumstances" standards
because a petitioner must satisfy both to reopen. That is, the peti-
tioner must demonstrate both that it is in the interests of justice to
reopen (i.e., there are good reasons why she did not assert the claim
in the original proceeding), and she has not waived the claim she
266. Id. (citation omitted); accord Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984);
Bowers v. State, 320 Md. 416, 578 A.2d 734 (1990).
267. Gross, 371 Md. at 349, 809 A.2d at 635 (quoting Oken, 343 Md. at 283, 681 A.2d at
43).
268. Bowers, 320 Md. at 425, 578 A.2d at 738 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693).
269. Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693).
270. Id. at 427, 578 A.2d at 739. For applications of these tests, see, e.g., Wiggins v. Smith,
539 U.S. 510 (2003); Williams v. State, 326 Md. 367, 605 A.2d 103 (1992).
271. MD. CODE ANN., CIUM. PROC. § 7-106(c) (2004). This provision was part of the legis-
lative package of revisions in 1965. See supra Part III.C.l.h (describing the components of
the 1965 amendments to the Act).
272. CRIM. PROC. § 7-106(c) (2).
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
wishes to assert by failing to assert it before (i.e., there are "special
circumstances" for this omission).
Because the "interests ofjustice" and "special circumstances" stan-
dards are fact dependent, it is difficult to generalize about case
profiles that might satisfy them. Assuming proper facts, however,
there are two that should be good candidates.
a. A Showing of Innocence.-Maryland law contains two provi-
sions that allow some prisoners to assert newly discovered evidence,
including of innocence, under limited circumstances.
Maryland Rule 4-331 (c) allows three groups of litigants to file mo-
tions for new trials based on "newly discovered evidence."273 To be
successful, a movant must first establish that the evidence is "in fact,
newly discovered evidence-evidence that could not have been discov-
ered by due diligence in time to have presented it [earlier],"274 and,
second, demonstrate "that the newly discovered evidence 'may well
have produced a different result, that is, there was a substantial or
significant possibility that the verdict of the trier of fact would have
been affected.' 27 5
Those who are eligible to file motions under Rule 4-331(c) are:
(1) any defendant who files a motion within one year after final judg-
ment;276 (2) a death-sentenced prisoner who "at any time" files a mo-
tion containing new evidence that "if proven, would show that the
defendant is innocent of the capital crime . . .or of an aggravating
circumstance or other condition of eligibility for the death penalty"
that the decisionmaker "actually found" when it "impos [ed] the death
sentence"; 277 and (3) any defendant who "at any time" files a motion
"based on DNA identification testing or other generally accepted sci-
entific techniques the results of which, if proven, would show that the
defendant is innocent of the crime of which the defendant was
convicted. "278
273. MD. R. 4 -331(c).
274. Jackson v. State, 358 Md. 612, 626, 751 A.2d 473, 480 (2000) (quoting Yorke v.
State, 315 Md. 578, 588, 556 A.2d 230, 235 (1989)). The defendant must file the motion
for a new trial within ten days after a verdict. MD. R. 4-331 (a).
275. Jackson, 358 Md. at 626, 751 A.2d at 480 (quoting Yorke, 315 Md. at 588, 566 A.2d at
235).
276. MD. R. 4-331(c) (1). The date of finality is "the date the [trial] court imposed sen-
tence or the date it received a mandate issued by the Court of Appeals or Special Appeals,
whichever is later." Id.
277. Id. 4 -331(c) (2).
278. Id. 4-331 (c) (3).
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The 2001 DNA Evidence-Postconviction Review Act
279 provides a
narrower remedy by which some prisoners can obtain DNA evidence
of "wrongful conviction or sentencing" 280 and assert a claim based on
that evidence. 28 ' It authorizes a person convicted of an enumerated
crime (murder, manslaughter, rape, and sexual offense crimes),282 to
"file a petition for DNA testing of scientific identification evidence
283
that the State possesses. 284 A court "shall order DNA testing" if a two-
part test is satisfied: (1) there is a "reasonable probability" that the
requested testing "has the scientific potential to produce exculpatory or
mitigating evidence relevant to a claim of wrongful conviction or sen-
tencing, '285 and (2) the test requested "employs a method of testing
generally accepted within the relevant scientific community. "286 If the
test results are "unfavorable to the petitioner," the Act directs the
court to dismiss the petition.287 If they are "favorable," the court shall
either "open a postconviction proceeding" if the petitioner has not
before initiated one, or reopen the petitioner's prior proceeding.
288
The Act does not give a petitioner the right to counsel.
289 Nor
does it specify when a petitioner may be granted, or is entitled to, a
hearing. Because this provision is new, there is not a substantial body
of case law interpreting and applying it.
29 °
279. Act of May 15, 2001, ch. 418, 2001 Md. Laws 2494 (codified as amended at MD.
CODE ANN., CIUM. PROC. § 8-201 (2004 Supp.)).
280. CuM. PRoc. § 8-201 (c) (1).
281. Id § 8-201(h) (2).
282. Id. § 8-201(b).
283. Id. (emphasis added).
284. Id. The Act requires the State to preserve some types of evidence for limited peri-
ods of time. Id § 8-201 (i), (j).
285. Id. § 8-201(c)(1) (emphasis added).
286. Id § 8-201 (c) (2).
287. Id § 8-201(h)(1).
288. Id. § 8-201 (h)(2).
289. Trimble v. State, 157 Md. App. 73, 81, 849 A.2d 83, 87-88 (2004).
290. For applications of similar provisions in other states, see, e.g., State v. Bronson, 672
N.W.2d 244, 250-51 (Neb. 2003) (applying a comparable Nebraska DNA provision, and
holding that "a court may properly grant a motion to vacate and set aside the judgment
under [a Nebraska statute] when (1) the DNA testing results exonerate or exculpate the
person and (2) the results, when considered with the evidence of the case which resulted
in the underlying judgment, show a complete lack of evidence to establish an essential
element of the crime charged"); Shuttle v. State, No. E2003-00131-CCA-R3-PC, 2004 WL
199826, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2004) (reversing a lower court's refusal, in a postconvic-
tion proceeding under the Tennessee DNA Analysis Act, to order DNA testing and finding
that petitioner had established a "reasonable probability that he would not have been pros-
ecuted or convicted if exculpatory DNA evidence had been obtained"). See also Saffold v.
State, 850 So. 2d 574 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (interpreting a comparable Florida statute);
State v. Kinder, 122 S.W.3d 624, 632-33 (Mo. 2003) (interpreting a comparable Missouri
statute). Similar statutes exist in Colorado (CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 18-1-411 to -416
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There is a group of prisoners who fall outside the combined
scope of these two protections. That group includes those who, more
than a year after their convictions, are able to obtain and produce
compelling, nonscientific evidence that they are factually innocent.
There are two ways in which such a demonstration of innocence could
be relevant. It might constitute a freestanding, substantive claim,
based on the federal and state constitutions, which a prisoner could
assert on postconviction."9' Or, it might be a factor that a court uses
to excuse the waiver of another, separate substantive claim. Under
this theory, innocence is the "gateway ''292 to the other claim, through
which the court may consider and resolve that claim on the merits. 2 93
Although the standards of proof may differ, Maryland's courts
should adopt both the gateway and freestanding theories of inno-
cence as Maryland law.
(1) Freestanding Innocence.-In Herrera v. Collins,294 the Su-
preme Court considered a constitutional claim of freestanding inno-
cence. 295  Although the Court initially appeared to reject the
argument,2 6 it backtracked later in the opinion:
We may assume, for the sake of argument in deciding this
case, that in a capital case a truly persuasive demonstration
of "actual innocence" made after trial would render the exe-
cution of a defendant unconstitutional, and warrant federal
(West 2004)); Delaware (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 4504 (2001)); the District of Columbia(D.C. CODE ANN. § 224133 (Supp. 2004)); Idaho (IDAHO CODE § 19-4902 (Michie Supp.
2003)); Louisiana ([A. CODE CrIM. PROC. ANN. art. 926.1 (West Supp. 2005)); Maine (ME.REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2138 (West 2003)); New Mexico (N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-1A-2(Michie Cum. Supp. 2003)); Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. § 7 8-35a-301 (Supp. 2002)); and
Washington (WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.73.170 (West Supp. 2005)).
291. See the excellent analysis of the constitutional support for this argument in George
C. Thomas III et al., Is It Ever Too Late for Innocence? Finality, Efficiency, and Claims of Inno-
cence, 64 U. PiTr. L. REv. 263 (2003).
292. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404 (1993).
293. Id. The Court in Herrera said that, under this theory, "a claim of 'actual innocence'is not itself a constitutional claim, but instead a gateway through which a habeas petitioner
must pass to have his otherwise barred constitutional claim considered on the merits." Id.
294. 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
295. Herrera grounded his claim in the Eighth Amendment's proscription of cruel and
unusual punishments and the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process. Id. at396-97. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, identified the different concep-
tions of due process that the majority and dissent had. Id. at 407 n.6. For the majority, theissue was one of procedural due process-"whether [due process] entitles petitioner tojudicial review of his 'actual innocence' claim." Id. For the dissent, it was one of substan-
tive due process-"whether due process prohibits the execution of an innocent person."
Id.
296. Id. at 404-05.
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habeas relief if there were no state avenue open to process
such a claim. But because of the very disruptive effect that
entertaining claims of actual innocence would have on the
need for finality in capital cases, and the enormous burden
that having to retry cases based on often stale evidence
would place on the States, the threshold showing for such an
assumed right would necessarily be extraordinarily high.
29 7
Courts and commentators have analyzed the various opinions in
Herrera in an effort to "count the votes" for and against the freestand-
ing innocence argument. 298 It is clear that, assuming there is such a
right, the Justices disagreed about the appropriate standard of proof
to establish innocence. 99
State courts have greater reason than do federal courts to recog-
nize the constitutional basis of freestanding claims of innocence, as
several have recognized.
297. Id. at 417. Justice O'Connor, joined byJustice Kennedy, concurring, said that "the
execution of a legally and factually innocent person would be a constitutionally intolerable
event," but she concluded that Herrera was not innocent. Id. at 419 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
298. See, e.g., In re Clark, 855 P.2d 729, 760 (Cal. 1993) ("A majority of the justices of the
United States Supreme Court have expressed a belief that the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments preclude execution of an innocent person," citing the Herrera opinions of
Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Kennedy; of Justice White; and of Justice Blackmun,
joined by Justice Stevens and Justice Souter); State ex rel. Holmes v. Court of Appeals, 885
S.W.2d 389, 397 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) ("From our reading of Herrera, we understand six
members of the Supreme Court to have recognized the execution of an innocent person
would violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution .... With this sound and fundamental principle ofjurisprudence we cannot
disagree; such an execution would surely constitute a violation of a constitutional or funda-
mental right."). But see People v. Washington, 665 N.E.2d 1330, 1335 (Ill. 1996) (stating
the Herrera opinions are "conflicted," but "[c]onflicted or not, at least for noncapital cases,
Herrera clearly states . .. that a freestanding claim of innocence is not cognizable as a
fourteenth amendment due process claim."); Thomas III et al., supra note 291, at 285:
Though some have treated the constitutional status of a free-standing claim of
innocence as settled by Herrera, we think Herrera did not go that far. The Court
reached, and rejected, Herrera's claim on the merits by assuming "for the sake of
argument in deciding this case" that "a truly persuasive demonstration of actual
innocence ... would render the execution of a defendant unconstitutional, and
warrant federal habeas relief if there were no state avenue open to process such a
claim."
Id (footnotes omitted). The Washington court, however, went on to find the right of the
collateral petitioner to assert freestanding innocence was protected by the state due pro-
cess clause. 665 N.E.2d at 1337.
299. Chief justice Rehnquist would have required a "truly persuasive demonstration"
(and a failure of the state process), Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417;Justice White, that "no rational
trier of fact could [find] proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt," id, at 429 (White, J.,
concurring); and Justice Blackmun, that the petitioner show "he probably is innocent," id.
at 442 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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In State ex rel. Amrine v. Roper,"°° the Missouri Supreme Court rec-
ognized a freestanding claim of innocence in a successive proceed-
ing.3"' In a 4-3 decision, the court held that the Herrera decision itself
envisioned a more vigorous role for state courts in cases involving in-
nocence claims.3 0 2 Indeed, in the view of ChiefJustice Rehnquist, the
federal courts have no role to play unless there is no "state avenue
open to process such a claim."3 0 3 The Missouri Supreme Court held
that state habeas corpus was an "avenue" by which a capital petitioner
could assert a "compelling case of actual innocence independent of
any constitutional violation at trial."30 4 In determining the required
standard of proof of innocence, the court said it was not "required toimpose as high a standard as would a federal court in reviewing a free-
standing claim of actual innocence, for ... this Court is not affected
by the federalism concerns that limit the federal courts' jurisdiction to
consider non-constitutional claims of actual innocence. 3 0 5 The court
concluded that the standard should be "a clear and convincing show-
ing of actual innocence that undermines confidence in the correct-
ness of the judgment. 3 0 6
300. 102 S.W.3d 541 (Mo. 2003).
301. Amrine was convicted of killing a fellow prisoner and sentenced to death. Id. at544. Throughout and after the trial, he claimed that he was innocent. He eventually sup-ported his innocence claim in state postconviction and federal habeas corpus proceedings
with affidavits of all three prisoners who had testified against him in which they each re-
canted their testimony. Id at 544-45; see Laura Denvir Stith, Symposium on Tomorrow's Issuesin State Constitutional Law: A Contrast of State and Federal Court Authority to Grant Habeas Relief,38 VAL. U. L. REv. 421, 424 (2004) (stating that when he lost in these proceedings, "Mr.Amrine made a final bid for habeas corpus relief directly in the Supreme Court of Mis-
souri .... [Hie was actually innocent of the crime, he argued. This should at least provide
a 'gateway' for consideration of his underlying constitutional claims under Schlup v. Delo.And, he argued, even if he could demonstrate no underlying constitutional violation, hisfreestanding claim of actual innocence, considered alone, should be enough to entitle him
to release or a new trial where, as here, all of the inculpatory evidence from his trial hadbeen discredited." (citing Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995)).
302. See Amrine, 102 S.W.3d at 546-47 (noting that the jurisdictional problems inherentin a federal court review of a state court conviction and sentence do not similarly "deprive
a state court from reviewing the conviction and sentence if its own state habeas law so
permitted").
303. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417.
304. Amrine, 102 S.W.3d at 547.
305. Id. at 548.
306. ld. The court found that Amrine's proof satisfied this standard and stated that "the
evidence supporting the conviction must be assessed in light of all of the evidence now
available." Id. The court emphasized that "the evidence [at trial] was not overwhelming.There was significant evidence indicating Amrine's innocence from the beginning ....There was no physical evidence linking Amrine to the murder... [and the three witnesses
against him] have now completely recanted their trial testimony." Id. The court reversedAmine's conviction and ordered that the State either file new charges or release him. Id.
at 549. "The State initially did file such charges, but a few months later dropped them and
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The source of the right in Amrine was the Missouri death penalty
statute, which contains a provision authorizing the Missouri Supreme
Court to consider the "strength of the evidence" in a capital case.
3 °7
The court added in dicta that the Missouri Constitution contains a
due process clause, and that, "as the purpose of the criminal justice
system is to convict the guilty and free the innocent, it is completely
arbitrary to continue to incarcerate and eventually execute an individ-
ual who is actually innocent."
30 8
In People v. Washington, °9 the Illinois Supreme Court considered
a noncapital petitioner's freestanding claim of innocence, which he as-
serted in a successive postconviction proceeding, and held that the
due process clause of the Illinois Constitution entitled the petitioner
to assert the claim.310 The court went beyond its reading of Herrera,
noting "we labor under no self-imposed constraint to follow federal
precedent in 'lockstep' in defining Illinois' due process protec-
tion."31 1 The court held that "when newly discovered evidence indi-
cates that a convicted person is actually innocent," both "procedural
and substantive due process" require that a court provide 
relief.312
released Mr. Amrine-nearly eighteen years after the murder of which he had once been
convicted." Stith, supra note 301, at 433.
307. Amrine, 102 S.W.3d at 547 (citing State v. Cheney, 967 S.W.2d 47 (Mo. 1998)).
308. Id at 547 n.3 (noting that even absent federal constitutional restraints, Article I,
section 10 of the Missouri Constitution prohibits such a due process violation).
309. 665 N.E.2d 1330 (Ill. 1996).
310. Id. at 1337.
311. Id. at 1335 (citation omitted).
312. Id. at 1336. The court said: "In terms of procedural due process, we believe that to
ignore such a claim would be fundamentally unfair . . . Imprisonment of the innocent
would also be so conscience shocking as to trigger operation of substantive due process."
Id. The court challenged the rigid "legal construct" that a person who has been convicted
in a constitutionally adequate trial must be considered guilty regardless of the counter-
vailing evidence. Id. "The stronger the [innocence] claim-the more likely it is that a
convicted person is actually innocent-the weaker is the legal construct dictating that the
person be viewed as guilty." Id. It follows that "[a] 'truly persuasive demonstration of
innocence' would effectively reduce the idea to legal fiction." Id. In sum, the court said:
"We believe that no person convicted of a crime should be deprived of life or liberty given
compelling evidence of actual innocence." Id. The test is whether the evidence is "new,
material, noncumulative and, most importantly, 'of such conclusive character' as would
'probably change the result on retrial.'" Id. at 1337. Other state courts have recognized
freestanding innocence as a collateral claim as well. See Miller v. Comm'r of Corr., 700
A.2d 1108 (Conn. 1997) (explaining that a petitioner must establish that he is actually
innocent even though he received a fair trial); Summerville v. Warden, 641 A.2d 1356,
1369 (Conn. 1994) (holding that "a substantial claim of actual innocence is cognizable by
way of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, even in the absence of proof by the petitioner
of an antecedent constitutional violation that affected the result of his criminal trial"); Ex
parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (holding that claims of actual inno-
cence are recognized in postconviction habeas corpus proceedings). But see State v. Byrd,
762 N.E.2d 1043, 1053 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001) (explaining that Ohio appellate courts have
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Distinguishing its prior decisions, the court said that although it
had in the past "perfunctorily evaluated new evidence claims in cases
brought under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act," it had never "ex-
pressly identified the constitutional right implicated in a freestanding
claim of innocence based upon new evidence."31
Judge Laura Denvir Stith, who sits on the Supreme Court of Mis-
souri, describes the significance of decisions like these:
These cases recognize that the authority of state courts to
recognize freestanding claims of actual innocence is not de-
rivative of the recognition of such claims in federal courts.
Federal courts must be concerned with issues of comity and
deference to state courts and state policies .... [B] eginning
with Wainwright v. Sykes, the United States Supreme Court
has narrowed the basis of federal habeas review and made
federalism an increasingly dominant factor in its decision
making. In Herrera and Schlup, it made clear that, in the ab-
sence of an underlying constitutional violation, it would hold
that principles of comity and deference preclude a federal
court from interfering with the judgment in a constitution-
ally adequate trial.
But, state courts can and, as is evident, often do provide
a remedy for such injustices under their state law, pursuant
to their authority under their state constitutions to grant
writs of habeas corpus in cases of actual innocence. 4
Maryland's courts could find that a noncapital collateral peti-
tioner has a constitutional right to assert a freestanding innocence
claim, under either the federal constitution, 15 or under Maryland's
Declaration of Rights, especially the "Law of the land" provision in
held freestanding innocence claims alone do not provide substantive grounds for postcon-
viction relief and should instead be raised as part of a motion for a new trial).
313. Washington, 665 N.E.2d at 1335.
314. Stith, supra note 301, at 436-37. Judge Stith also quoted Arleen Anderson:
The states must recognize that since Herrera, they shoulder most of the responsi-
bility for providing review of post-conviction claims of actual innocence, especially
in non-capital cases. This is particularly true since the passage of the Antiterror-
ism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), which, for example, denies
a federal habeas court jurisdiction in a capital case if the petitioner fails to raise
his claim in state court, even if the claim depends on an assertion of actual
innocence.
Arleen Anderson, Responding to the Challenge of Actual Innocence Claims After Herrera v. Col-
lins, 71 TEMP. L. Rv. 489, 498 (1998).
315. See Thomas III et al., supra note 291, at 264 (arguing that the Due Process Clauses
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments require courts to hear freestanding innocence
claims).
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Article 24." l6 In either event, the claim would be actionable under
section 7-102(a) (1) of the PCPA.1
17
Although the freestanding innocence argument is strongest when
the petitioner is under a sentence of death, it logically also applies to
prisoners who are serving noncapital sentences. "Imprisonment of the
innocent" is "conscience shocking" and intolerable as well.'
18
If a petitioner can satisfy the demanding burden of proving free-
standing innocence-although the issue has not been uniformly re-
solved, several state decisions support a standard requiring clear and
convincing evidence of innocence"19-the exceptions to waiver, espe-
cially the "special circumstances" provision, 2 ° ought to be liberally ap-
plied, as should the "interests of justice" reopening provision.3 21 It
would make little sense to recognize the principle, and then hold that
a demonstrably innocent person must remain in prison, perhaps for
life, because he failed to establish his innocence with due diligence.
(2) Gateway Innocence.-There is a counterintuitive quality
to the Supreme Court's clear recognition of gateway, but not free-
standing, innocence. Under the gateway doctrine, "[f] reeing the inno-
cent, a primary if not sole goal of the criminal justice system, plays the
role of a mere auxiliary doctrine whose only significance is to ease the
way for constitutional claims less weighty than itself." '322
316. MD. DECL. OF RTS. art. 24 provides: "Due process. That no man ought to be taken
or imprisoned or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or,
in any manner, destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment
of his peers, or by the Law of the land." Maryland's courts have held that exculpatory
evidence "does not ordinarily provide grounds for postconviction relief." Gray v. State, 158
Md. App. 635, 647, 857 A.2d 1176, 1183 (2004). Rather, "[t]he usual approach for dealing
with newly discovered evidence is set forth in Md. Rule 4-331." Id. In this line of cases,
however, the courts have not considered and resolved the claims based on Herrera and
Schlup, or the constitutional arguments Professor Gordon G. Young and his co-authors
make in Thomas III et al., supra note 291.
317. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 7-102(a) (1) (2004) (providing that a convicted per-
son may challenge his conviction if it was obtained in violation of the federal or state
constitution or state law).
318. People v. Washington, 665 N.E.2d 1330, 1336 (111. 1996).
319. See, e.g., Miller v. Comm'r of Corr., 700 A.2d 1108, 1130-31 (Conn. 1997) (explain-
ing that to establish a freestanding claim of innocence, the petitioner: (1) "must persuade
the habeas court by clear and convincing evidence.. . that the petitioner is actually inno-
cent of the crime of which he stands convicted," and (2) "must establish that, after consid-
ering all of that evidence and the inferences drawn therefrom, . . . no reasonable fact
finder would find the petitioner guilty"); Ex parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202, 209 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1996) (a life-sentenced "petitioner must show by clear and convincing evidence
that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of the new evidence").
320. See supra Part III.C.1.h(2).
321. See supra Part I.B.
322. Thomas III et al., supra note 291, at 284.
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In Maryland, the gateway doctrine should be based on the text
and legislative history of the "interests of justice" and "special circum-
stances" provisions of the PCPA.3 23 In Herrera, the Supreme Court
said that a federal court's power to accept a gateway innocence claim,
and thereby to excuse a prior procedural default, "is grounded in the
'equitable discretion' of habeas courts to see that federal constitu-
tional errors do not result in the incarceration of innocent per-
sons." 324  Maryland's courts are vested with similar equitable
discretion by the "interests of justice" and "special circumstances"
provisions.
Moreover, there is compelling evidence that the General Assem-
bly intended to make gateway innocence, at least, a ground to reopen
a postconviction proceeding. Recall that the initial "reopening" stan-
dard that the General Assembly considered in 1995 was the "miscar-
riage of justice" standard. 25 It rejected that standard because it was
too restrictive.326 But, according to its proponent, the Governor's Com-
mission on the Death Penalty, even that standard would have author-
ized a court to reopen a postconviction proceeding when a petitioner
demonstrated, as outlined by the Supreme Court that "a constitu-
tional violation has caused the conviction of one innocent of a
crime."3 2 7 In adopting the more generous "interests of justice" stan-
dard, the General Assembly indicated its intention to include, at a
minimum, innocence as a ground to reopen.32
The Supreme Court formulated and applied the innocence-based
"miscarriage of justice" standard in Herrera3 29 and Schlup. s ° In Her-
323. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. §§ 7-104, 7-106(b) (1) (ii) (2004).
324. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404 (1993).
325. See supra notes 257-263 and accompanying text.
326. See Act of April 11, 1995, ch. 110, § 645(a) (2), 1995 Md. Laws 1473, 1482.
327. GovERNOR'S COMM'N ON THE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 261, at 258-59 (recom-
mending the "miscarriage ofjustice" standard).
328. The legislative concern about the conviction and incarceration of the innocent is
manifest in other ways. See, e.g., CRM. PROC. § 8-201 (authorizing a court under certain
circumstances to order DNA testing upon a "reasonable probability" that the test has "the
scientific potential to produce exculpatory or mitigating evidence relevant to a claim of
wrongful conviction or sentencing").
329. Herrera produced evidence of his innocence ten years after his trial and after he
had exhausted his state appellate and postconviction, and federal habeas, remedies. Her-
rera, 506 U.S. at 393. He asserted his innocence in a successive habeas petition. In re-jecting Herrera's claim, Chief Justice Rehnquist emphasized the limited role of a federal
court in reviewing a state trial court's finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id at
400. The refusal of federal courts to consider freestanding claims of innocence "is
grounded in the principle that federal habeas courts sit to ensure that individuals are not
imprisoned in violation of the Constitution-not to correct errors of fact." Id. He con-
cluded that "[f]ew rulings would be more disruptive of our federal system than to provide
for federal habeas review of freestanding claims of actual innocence." Id. at 401.
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rera, the Court said a federal habeas petitioner "otherwise subject to
defenses of abusive or successive use of the writ may have his federal
constitutional claim considered on the merits if he makes a proper
showing of actual innocence. " "' If accepted, it allows the petitioner
to assert the "independent constitutional claim challenging his convic-
tion or sentence."
332
Rather than asserting his innocence as a substantive constitu-
tional claim, as Herrera had, Schlup asserted his innocence as a proce-
dural matter, to excuse defaults of two independent constitutional
claims.3 3 The Court held that Schlup did not have to satisfy the de-
manding Herrera standard of proof of actual innocence. In Herrera,
the Court explained that "petitioner's claim was evaluated on the as-
sumption that the trial that resulted in his conviction had been error
free. 3 34 In such cases, "it is appropriate to apply an 'extraordinarily
high' standard of review."33 5 In contrast, Schlup claimed that he was
denied a constitutionally fair trial.33 "For that reason," held the
Court, "Schlup's conviction may not be entitled to the same degree of
respect as one, such as Herrera's, that is the product of an error-free
trial."3
37
The standard of proof of actual innocence that is required to sat-
isfy the "gateway" test is "evidence of innocence so strong that a court
cannot have confidence in the outcome of the trial unless the court is
also satisfied that the trial was free of nonharmless constitutional er-
ror."33 '8 The court equated this with probable innocence, which
means "it is more likely than not that 'no reasonable juror' would
have convicted him" in the light of the new evidence. 3 9
These same considerations support interpreting the "interests of
justice" and "special circumstances" provisions of the PCPA340 to rec-
330. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995).
331. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 404.
332. Id.
333. Schlup claimed that because his counsel was ineffective and the prosecution with-
held evidence, he was denied a fair trial. Schiup, 513 U.S. at 313-14.
334. Id at 315.
335. Id. at 315-16.
336. Id at 316.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Id. at 329.
340. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. §§ 7-104, 7-106(b)(1)(ii) (2004). In Herrera, the
Court said that a federal court's power to accept a gateway innocence claim, and thereby
excuse a prior procedural default, "is grounded in the 'equitable discretion' of habeas
courts to see that federal constitutional errors do not result in the incarceration of inno-
cent persons." Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404 (1993). Similarly, the "interests of
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ognize a gateway theory of innocence, and thereby to allow petitioners
who meet this test to reopen prior postconviction proceedings and
assert once-waived claims. 4' This is what the Circuit Court for Balti-
more City did in the case of Michael Austin. 42
Michael Austin was convicted of murder in 1975 and sentenced
to life imprisonment.343 During the robbery of a food store, one of
two robbers shot and killed a security guard. A store employee and
four other eyewitnesses said the shooter was "a light skinned" African
American man, "5' 8" to 5' 10" tall, 150 to 160 pounds."344 Austin is 6'
5" tall and weighed 200 pounds at the time of the crime. Inexplicably,
the employee identified Austin as the shooter, both prior to trial
(from a photo array and in a line-up), and at trial.34 5 Austin was con-
victed based on the store employee's identification.
In fact, Austin was not involved in the robbery, but instead was at
work at the time, which his employer's work records confirmed. How-
ever, Austin's lawyer failed to subpoena the originals of these records
for trial. Austin obtained a copy, but it was a bad ("unintelligible")
copy that was excluded at trial. 46
During the years that followed, Austin, who maintained his inno-
cence, unsuccessfully challenged his conviction on direct appeal,
through motions for a new trial, in three postconviction proceedings,
in a belated appeal (the relief in the second postconviction proceed-
ing), and in appeals of the postconviction proceedings.347
justice" and "special circumstances" provisions grant broad equitable discretion to postcon-
viction courts.
341. Courts in other states have adopted the gateway innocence theory. See, e.g., Clay v.
Dormire, 37 S.W.3d 214, 217 (Mo. 2000) (noting the applicable standard that actual inno-
cence is "a gateway through which the habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise
barred constitutional claims considered"); State v. Pope, 80 P.3d 1232 (Mont. 2003) (ex-
plaining that the standard after Schiup was whether a reasonable juror would convict based
on the new evidence); Ex parte Franklin, 72 S.W.3d 671, 675-76 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)
(differentiating between Herrera- and Schlup-type cases).
342. Larry A. Nathans (chief counsel) and Booth Ripke represented Mr. Austin in this
proceeding.
343. Austin v. State, No. 17401280-82, slip op. at 2 (Md. Cir. Ct. Dec. 27, 2001). Austin
also received a consecutive fifteen-year sentence for a handgun violation and a concurrent
ten-year sentence for grand larceny. Id. at 2-3.
344. Id. at 11.
345. Id. at 33. This employee also identified from photographs the other alleged rob-
ber, but when he saw that defendant in person at that defendant's separate trial, the em-
ployee said he was not the robber, and the State dismissed the charges against him. Id. at
35.
346. Id. at 56.
347. Id. at 1.
1024 [VOL. 64:968
2005] COLLATERAL REMEDIES IN CRIMINAL CASES IN MARYLAND 1025
In 2001, Austin moved to reopen his postconviction proceedings
based on new evidence of his innocence.348 After a hearing, the Cir-
cuit Court for Baltimore City, Judge John Carroll Byrnes presiding,
found that the credibility of the State's sole eyewitness, the store em-
ployee, had been "severely compromised, if not destroyed '349 by the
new evidence (which showed the employee was a drug abuser and
criminal, rather than an industrious college student, as depicted at
trial) .15 The evidence also established that a coworker in the store,
who "stood within inches of the shooter, '351' had said he was certain
that Austin was absolutely not the shooter,352 and destroyed a damag-
ing, alleged link between Austin and the alleged co-robber (the store
employee subsequently testified at the alleged co-robber's trial that
that defendant was not the co-robber, making the alleged link
irrelevant) .
The court decided to reopen the case. It construed the "interests
of justice" standard and gateway innocence exception in pari mateia.
It found that Austin's demonstration of innocence under the Schiup
test-"it is more likely than not that 'no reasonable juror' would have
convicted him" 354 given the new evidence-satisfied the "interests of
justice" test, removing the "finally decided" and "waiver" bars and al-
lowing the court to reconsider issues that Austin previously had liti-
gated or failed to raise. 355 The court found that the showing of
innocence was an independent ground for excusing waiver. It also
could have found that a "special circumstance" excused waiver. 56
The court reversed Austin's conviction on three grounds: (1) his
trial lawyer was constitutionally ineffective;357 (2) the prosecutor made
an improper and prejudicial closing argument;358 and (3) the jury
had been improperly instructed that it was the judge of the law as well
as of the facts. 59 The court, however, rejected Austin's freestanding
innocence claim, finding that although Austin had satisfied the lower
348. Much of this evidence was developed by an "innocence project" called Centurion
Ministries; other evidence was obtained from police files after Austin's second postconvic-
tion proceeding. Id. at 31 n.41.
349. Id. at 57.
350. Id. at 48-49.
351. Id. at 58.
352. Id. at 56-57.
353. Id. at 49-51.
354. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 329 (1995).
355. Austin, slip op. at 62-64, 78-80, 82-83.
356. See supra Part III.C.l.h(2).
357. Austin, slip op. at 86.
358. Id. at 77-82.
359. Id. at 59-64.
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gateway standard based on Schlup, he had not satisfied the higher free-
standing standard based on Herrera.360
Following the decision, the State's Attorney's Office dismissed the
charges against Austin; Governor Robert Ehrlich gave Austin a "full
and unconditional pardon"; and the Maryland Board of Public Works
awarded him $1,405,000 for his over twenty-six years of wrongful
incarceration.361
This case demonstrates the critical importance of incorporating
the gateway innocence test into Maryland's postconviction law.
b. Reasonably Unforeseeable Developments in the Law.-To date,
Maryland's appellate courts have made little use of two exceptions to
waiver: (1) the "special circumstances" provision in section 7-
106(b)(1)(ii), 36 2 and (2) the "new standard" provision in section 7-
106(c).363 The use in the latter provision of the word "standard"
rather than "rule," and the history of that provision (part of a package
of reforms aimed at reducing procedural defaults),364 strongly suggest
that it should be used more frequently to forgive defaults like the one
360. Id. at 86-92; see also supra Part IV.C.2.a(1).
361. Release of Claims executed by Michael Austin on November 11, 2004 (on file with
author).
362. See supra Part III.C.l.h(2); Washington v. Warden, 243 Md. 316, 322, 220 A.2d 607,
610 (1966) (holding that petitioner's mental illness was a "special circumstance" that ex-
cused his failure to assert a claim in earlier postconviction proceedings). The "special
circumstances" provision may have been an inadvertent casualty of the Court of Appeals's
decision in Curtis v. State, when the court held that the provision applied directly only to
claims based on fundamental rights. 284 Md. 132, 395 A.2d 464 (1978); see supra Part
III.C.l.h(1). This made the provision largely irrelevant since it is the rare case in which a
defendant who makes an express, on-the-record, informed waiver of a claim will be able to
demonstrate good reasons-i.e., "special circumstances"-that will excuse that waiver. In
recent years, however, Maryland's appellate courts have rediscovered the special circum-
stances provision, and applied it indirectly in postconviction cases to the waivers of
nonfundamental rights. The courts have done so by initially looking outside the PCPA to
"case law or any pertinent statutes or rules," but then finding that the PCPA special circum-
stances provision is a "pertinent statute," and thereby returning to that provision indirectly.
Curtis, 284 Md. at 149-51, 395 A.2d at 468; see supra Part III.C.l.h(2).
363. See supra Part IV.C.I.b. There are a few decisions in which Maryland's appellate
courts have, or appear to have, applied this provision. See, e.g., State v. Dowdell, 73 Md.
App. 172, 533 A.2d 695 (1987) (applying retroactively in postconviction proceedings the
ineffective assistance of counsel standards announced by the Supreme Court in Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)); DeLawder v. Warden, 23 Md. App. 435, 328 A.2d 76
(1974) (remanding the case to a hearing judge to determine whether, pursuant to the
PCPA new-standards provision and the Supreme Court's decision in Davis v. Alaska, 415
U.S. 308 (1974), which held that the right of confrontation mandates that the defendant
be allowed to show possible bias of a prosecution witness by cross-examining the witness on
his probationary status as a juvenile delinquent, was applicable and if it should be retroac-
tively applied).
364. See supra Part III.C.l.h.
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I am about to describe. I believe the following hypothetical, which is
based on a recurrent scenario, should satisfy the "new standard" provi-
sion. My focus in this discussion, however, is on the "special circum-
stances" exception.
In the case profile that I have in mind, there is an appellate deci-
sion that applies an established but broadly stated legal principle in a
new specific way that defense lawyers and lower courts reasonably
could not have anticipated. The appellate court, pointing to the legal
principle, concludes that its decision, or that of another court, does
not constitute a new standard within the meaning of section 7-106(c).
However, only a handful of prescient defense lawyers have protected
their clients by preserving the error in their cases. The majority of
lawyers acted competently. Their omissions were not tactical, or even
conscious. They, like the great majority of trial judges, simply did not
anticipate, and could not have reasonably anticipated, the decision.
If the new decision comes down after a prisoner has completed
the direct appellate process, and the prisoner did not raise the issue at
trial or on appeal, the prisoner would have to show special circum-
stances to raise the issue on postconviction. If the prisoner has com-
pleted the postconviction process, the prisoner would have to
demonstrate both that it is "in the interests of justice" '365 to reopen,
and special circumstances exist to excuse the waiver. However, given
that the "special circumstances" test probably is the stricter of the two,
the central issue in my hypothetical case is the same: do special cir-
cumstances excuse waiver?
I believe they should under the circumstances I describe. The
"lottery" quality of our criminal justice system is most apparent in
these cases. Prisoners who had the handful of prescient lawyers get
new trials; the many more who did not remain incarcerated, some for
life. In many of these cases, the interests of the petitioner in a fair
trial and equal treatment should outweigh the efficiency and finality
interests of the state.
As noted earlier, Maryland's Court of Appeals has said that "spe-
cial circumstances" may exist when defense counsel fails to preserve
error because of a "misconception by a large segment of the bench
and the bar" about the governing law.3 66 In Reed v. Ross,3 67 the Su-
preme Court summarized the arguments for excusing waiver under
these circumstances. The Court said that "where a constitutional
365. MD. R. 4-406(c).
366. Walker v. State, 343 Md. 629, 648, 684 A.2d 429, 438 (1996); see supra Part III.C.1.h.
367. 468 U.S. 1 (1984).
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claim is so novel that its legal basis is not reasonably available to coun-
sel, a defendant has cause for his failure to raise the claim in accor-
dance with applicable state procedures. '368 In these circumstances,
the "procedural failure is not attributable to an intentional decision
by counsel made in pursuit of his client's interests.3 69 It is not a prod-
uct of "strategic motives of any sort."370 In addition, it is unlikely, ei-
ther that the trial court, on its own, considered the argument or
would have accepted it if defense counsel had made it. The Supreme
Court explained:
Just as it is reasonable to assume that a competent lawyer will
fail to perceive the possibility of raising such a claim, it is also
reasonable to assume that a court will similarly fail to appre-
ciate the claim. It is in the nature of our legal system that
legal concepts, including constitutional concepts, develop
slowly, finding partial acceptance in some courts while meet-
ing rejection in others. Despite the fact that a constitutional
concept may ultimately enjoy general acceptance .... when
the concept is in its embryonic stage, it will, by hypothesis, be
rejected by most courts.3 7 1
It follows that "requiring a defendant to raise a truly novel issue is
not likely to serve any functional purpose. 3 7 2 Indeed, such a require-
ment would be disruptive. "If novelty were never cause [for a proce-
dural default], counsel on appeal would be obliged to raise and argue
every conceivable constitutional claim, no matter how far fetched, in
order to preserve a right for post-conviction relief upon some future,
unforeseen development in the law."3 7 3 Trial lawyers would have to
do the same. This would encourage trial and appellate lawyers to
make "meritless and frivolous" contentions, rather than those "legiti-
mately regarded as debatable. 3 74
Therefore, basing waiver on counsel's failure to make reasonably
unforeseeable arguments "would not promote either the fairness or
the efficiency of the state criminal justice system. '375 Admittedly, ap-
plying Maryland's "special circumstances" exception in this way would
have a "finality interest" cost. But, the finality interest is not the only
368. Id. at 16.
369. Id. at 14.
370. Id. at 15.
371. Id.
372. Id.
373. Id. at 16 (quoting Reed v. Ross, 704 F.2d 705, 708 (4th Cir. 1984)).
374. Id. (quoting Reed, 704 F.2d at 708).
375. Id. at 15.
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one in these cases, and in these circumstances, the countervailing in-
terests should outweigh it.
There should be limits, of course. The petitioner should be re-
quired to prove that counsel's failure to assert the error was inadver-
tent, not tactical, and was based on a shared misunderstanding about
the applicable law. It also might be appropriate to require that the
error the petitioner seeks to assert, based on the new interpretation,
satisfy a "prejudice" test that reflects serious concern about the relia-
bility of the outcome of the petitioner's trial or sentencing proceed-
ing. 76 Using, by analogy, the second prong of the Strickland test for
ineffective assistance of counsel, or the similar second prong of the
test for motions for a new trial, a petitioner would have to show there
was a "substantial possibility" that the error changed the outcome in
the case.3 77 Assuming such proof, Maryland's courts should recognize
these circumstances both as an exception to the waiver rule and an
application of the "interests of justice" reopening standard.
What follows is an example of circumstances that I believe should
qualify under the reasonably unforeseeable exception to waiver, based
on a "misconception by a large segment of the bench and the bar"
about the governing legal rule.1
7 1
376. As part of my hypothetical, the new interpretation does not satisfy the "new stan-
dard" test of section 7-106(c). If it did, the petitioner would have to show only that the new
standard would "affect the validity of the petitioner's conviction or sentence."
377. Bowers v. State, 320 Md. 416, 427, 578 A.2d 734, 739 (1990) (ineffective assistance
of counsel); Jackson v. State, 358 Md. 612, 626, 751 A.2d 473, 480 (2000) (motion for new
trial).
378. Walker v. State, 343 Md. 629, 648, 684 A.2d 429, 438 (1996). The Walker court
explained why the court in Franklin v. State, 319 Md. 116, 120, 571 A.2d 1208, 1210 (1990),
had invoked the "plain error" rule on direct appeal to excuse a waiver. Franklin involved
an erroneous intent instruction that was delivered at a time when the trial court "did not
have the benefit" of the Court of Appeals's later clarification that a charge of assault with
intent to kill requires proof of a specific intent to kill (rather than proof of an intent to
inflict serious injury). Id. at 126, 571 A.2d at 1213. The Walker court explained that, be-
cause Franklin's defense was based on his intent, and the jury's instructions were not given
in accordance with the Court of Appeals's subsequent clarification of the intent require-
ment, the court could apply "plain error." Walker, 343 Md. at 649, 684 A.2d at 438; accord
Parker v. State, 4 Md. App. 62, 67, 241 A.2d 185, 188 (1968) (appellant's failure to object to
an erroneous instruction was neither "a bad guess [n]or a trial tactic but resulted rather
from a misunderstanding of the applicable law-a misunderstanding also shared by the
court, and by the State," therefore the waiver should be excused). But see Hunt v. State,
345 Md. 122, 691 A.2d 1255 (1997) (finding that there was no change in the law that
excused the failure of counsel to preserve a legal argument, and counsel for Hunt had an
opportunity to bring to the court's attention the decision allegedly recognizing the new
rule); Oken v. State, 343 Md. 256, 271, 681 A.2d 30, 37 (1996) (finding that the law was
clearly established at the time that counsel failed to object to the sufficiency of the jury voir
dire, and counsel deliberately failed to raise the matter on appeal as a tactical matter).
The case example that I use is based on an unreported opinion of the Maryland Court of
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For many years, most of Maryland's judges and lawyers believed
that courts were required to instruct juries in criminal cases that the
juries were judges of the law as well as of the facts, and that the court's
instructions on the law were merely advisory. The mandate to give
this instruction derived from a provision of the Maryland Constitution
stating: "In the trial of all criminal cases, the Jury shall be the Judges
of Law, as well as of fact." '79 This provision reflected Revolution-era
distrust of judges, especially those loyal to the Crown.3 '
In Stevenson v. State,38' the Court of Appeals held, for the first
time, that courts could not generally instruct juries that they were
judges of the law, despite the seemingly clear contrary requirement in
the state constitutional provision. To do so would violate the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution. 82 There had been minor judicially imposed limits on the
advisory-law provision before, 83 but this was a dramatically different
interpretation of it. The court saved the state advisory-law provision
by judicially rewriting it. The court found that this provision did not
"facially deprive [ ] a defendant of the federally secured right to due
Special Appeals in Arey v. State, 153 Md. App. 716 (2003), cert. denied, 380 Md. 231, 844 A.2d
427 (2004). I was co-counsel for Mr. Arey.
379. Md. Dec. of Rts. art. 23.
380. In Slansky v. State, the court said:
In England the question whether the jury should have the right to decide the law
in criminal cases was for centuries the subject of controversy. But at the time of
American independence the prevailing rule of the common law in England was
that the court should judge the law, and the jury should apply the law to the facts.
This doctrine was condemned by some of the Colonial statesmen, notably John
Adams, who believed that the juries should be entitled to disregard the arbitrary
and unjust rulings of the judges holding office by authority of the Crown.
' The colonists had had experience of the close connection of criminal law
with politics.... [T] heir constant fear of political oppression through the crimi-
nal law led them and the generation following... to give excessive power to juries
and to limit or even cut off the power of the trial judge to control the trial and
hold the jury to its province.
192 Md. 94, 101-02, 63 A.2d 599, 601-02 (1949).
381. 289 Md. 167, 423 A.2d 558 (1980).
382. As the court explained more fully a year later, due process incorporates "certain
bedrock" rights "which are indispensable to the integrity of every criminal trial," including
that "(1) The accused is presumed innocent until proved guilty by the State by evidence
beyond a reasonable doubt," and that "The State has the burden to produce evidence of
each element of the crime establishing the defendant's guilt." Montgomery v. State, 292
Md. 84, 91, 437 A.2d 654, 658 (1981).
383. In Stevenson, the court cited to past decisions in which it had held under the advi-
sory-law provision thatjuries could not determine a court's jurisdiction or resolve questions
of admissibility of evidence and competency of witnesses, and that it did not have unlim-
ited discretion to arbitrarily create new laws and disregard established ones. 289 Md. at
178-79, 423 A.2d at 564-65.
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process of law" '384 because it did not authorize juries "to decide all
matters that may be correctly included under the generic label
'law."' 3 85 Instead, the court said, the jury's law-deciding right is lim-
ited "'to resolv[ing] conflicting interpretations of the law [of the
crime] and to decid[ing] whether th[at] law should be applied in du-
bious factual situations', and nothing more."386
Although the Court of Appeals denied that its Stevenson decision
established a new rule,3 87 it certainly established a new constitutionally
compelled interpretation of the advisory-law provision. The Court of
Special Appeals has emphasized this on several occasions. In Petric v.
State,388 for example, the court said: "Ere Stevenson, it was generally
thought by bench and bar alike that jurors in criminal cases were
judges of the law and fact."3 89 But, the court said, "Stevenson made
clear that such was not the situation, but that ajury's judicial role was
limited to the 'law of the crime.' Other legal issues were for the judge
to determine.3 9" In Allnutt v. State,391 the court had previously noted
that "[u] ntil Stevenson .... it was generally believed by bench and bar
that a judge's comments as to the law in a criminal case were advisory
and not binding on the jury. "392 But, "Stevenson told us that a jury's
judicial role was limited to the 'law of the crime' and 'that all other
legal issues are for the judges alone to decide." 393 The court added:
"Confusion then arose as to what was meant by the term 'law of the
crime."'3 94 The answer, the court said, came "[o] ne year later [when]
the Court in Montgomery v. State sought to still the roiling waters by
explicating Stevenson."395 The "message of Montgomery," the court said,
"is that Article 23 . . . [is] 'limited to those instances when the jury is
the final arbiter of the law of the crime'; that is to say where there is a
dispute as to the state of the law."396
384. Id. at 169, 423 A.2d at 559.
385. Id. at 178, 423 A.2d at 564.
386. Id. at 179, 423 A.2d at 564 (quoting Dillon v. State, 277 Md. 571, 581, 357 A.2d 360,
367 (1976)).
387. Id. at 189, 423 A.2d at 570.
388. 66 Md. App. 470, 504 A.2d 1168 (1986).
389. Id. at 478, 504 A.2d at 1172.
390. Id. (citations omitted).
391. 59 Md. App. 694, 478 A.2d 321 (1984).
392. Id. at 701, 478 A.2d at 324.
393. Id. at 702, 478 A.2d at 325.
394. Id.
395. Id.
396. Id. (quoting Montgomery v. State, 292 Md. 84, 89, 437 A.2d 654, 657 (1981)).
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In Jenkins v. Hutchinson,397 the Fourth Circuit held that the stan-
dard Maryland advisory-law instruction given before Stevenson denied
Jenkins his due process right to a mandatory "reasonable doubt" in-
struction.398 The question, the court said, is not a refined one about
the nuances of a proper reasonable doubt instruction. "The issue
here, in contrast, is whether the jury was effectively given any reasona-
ble doubt instruction at all.' "99 The unacceptable constitutional risk,
the court said, is that "the jury understood the advisory nature of the
instructions as permitting it to ignore the reasonable doubt instruc-
tion," therefore licensing it to "fashion any standard of proof that it
liked."4 o
The Fourth Circuit concluded that, at least, "there is a reasonable
likelihood" that the jury applied the challenged instruction in an un-
constitutional manner.4" 1 The court acknowledged that the flawed in-
struction was required by state law, but found this "irrelevant to the
due process claim," as even if the instruction were "proper as a matter
of state law," it "violates the Due Process Clause of the federal Consti-
tution."402 It cited In re Winship4 °3 in support of its decision.
40 4
397. 221 F.3d 679 (4th Cir. 2000).
398. Id at 685.
399. Id. at 684.
400. Id.
401. Id. at 685.
402. Id. at 685 n.11. The injury flowing from the advisory-law instruction is "structural"
in an even greater sense than when the Supreme Court used that term in Sullivan v. Louisi-
ana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993). In Sullivan, a unanimous Court held that a defective reasonable
doubt instruction denied Sullivan his right to a fair trial in violation of the Sixth and Four-
teenth Amendments. In holding that the harmless error doctrine was inapplicable to the
flawed instruction, the Sullivan Court ranked the right to a proper reasonable doubt in-
struction with the right to counsel, right to an unbiased judge, and right to self-representa-
tion. The Court said:
The inquiry.., is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty
verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually
rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error. That must be so,
because to hypothesize a guilty verdict that was never in fact rendered-no matter
how inescapable the findings to support that verdict might be-would violate the
jury-trial guarantee.
Id. at 279. Without a proper reasonable doubt instruction, "there has been no jury verdict
within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment." Id. at 280. The Court said that this is
"structural" error, quoting from Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309 (1991), and that
the absence of a proper reasonable doubt instruction undermines the 'jury guarantee,
which is a "'basic protection' whose precise effects are unmeasurable, but without which a
criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function." Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 281 (quoting Rose v.
Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577 (1986)).
403. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
404. Jenkins, 221 F.3d at 683. Based on In re Winship, the Fourth Circuit found that its
decision in Jenkins did not create a "new rule" within the meaning of Teague v. Lane, 489
U.S. 288, 299 (1989). Assuming that is correct, which I believe it is, it does not mean that
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In 1970, in In re Winship, the Supreme Court held that (1) the
Constitution requires a state, in the adjudicatory stage of a delin-
quency proceeding, to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, and
(2) in the process, recognized the constitutional basis of the reasona-
ble doubt standard.4 °5 The decision was noteworthy because of the
first point, not the second. The reasonable doubt standard had been
part of Maryland's criminal law for years,4"6 and it had coexisted with
the advisory-law provision of the state constitution for years. During
the nine years between In re Winship and Stevenson, neither the Rules
Committee,40 7 nor Maryland's appellate courts, 40 8 nor its lower bench
or bar,40 9 contended that the general statement of constitutional prin-
ciple in In re Winship threatened the continued viability of the advi-
sory-law provision.
In sum, this is one example, I believe, of a set of circumstances
that should satisfy the "special circumstances" and "interests ofjustice"
standards for forgiving waiver and reopening a postconviction pro-
ceeding.410 Admittedly, this would have an impact on a number of
older convictions, especially of life-sentenced prisoners who had jury
trials. I do not underestimate the "finality" costs of my argument.
They are very substantial. However, it also might be possible, by exam-
ining the records on a case-by-case basis, to evaluate the extent to
the Maryland bench and bar should reasonably have anticipated Stevenson and Montgomery,
based on In re Winship. Put another way, whether the reasonable unforeseeability of a
subsequent decision should comprise a "special circumstance" excusing waiver under the
PCPA is a substantially different issue than whether a federal habeas decision would estab-
lish a "new rule" under Teague and the AEDPA.
405. 397 U.S. 358.
406. E.g., In re Spalding, 273 Md. 690, 332 A.2d 246 (1975); Lindsay v. State, 8 Md. 100,
258 A.2d 760 (1969); Jenkins v. State, 238 Md. 451, 209 A.2d 616 (1965).
407. In 1975, Maryland Rule 756(b) required a trial court to instruct the jury in every
case in which it gave instructions that "they are the judges of the law and that the court's
instructions are advisory only."
408. See, e.g., Hamilton v. State, 12 Md. App. 91, 277 A.2d 460 (1971), affd, 265 Md. 256,
288 A.2d 885 (applying the advisory-law provision).
409. There is no public contention that I can find, or unpublished contention of which
I am aware, suggesting that In re Winship had imperiled the validity of the advisory-law
provision.
410. See, e.g., State v. Howard, 564 N.W.2d 753 (Wis. 1997). In Howard, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court applied its "sufficient reason" exception to the waiver doctrine under the
Wisconsin version of the UPCPA to excuse the failure of Howard's lawyers to foresee a
subsequent interpretation of a state statute. Id. at 762. It considered and rejected the
State's argument that "Howard had available to him all of the statutes, legislative history,
and the rules of statutory construction" that the later party who was successful had available
to him. Id. The Howard court held that the subsequent interpretation of the statute was
not reasonably foreseeable, and said: "To hold otherwise would require criminal defend-
ants and their counsel to raise every conceivable issue on appeal in order to preserve objec-
tions to rulings that may be affected by some subsequent holding in an unrelated case." Id.
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which the advisory-law instruction likely infected the rest of the in-
structions and the extent to which it likely did not do so. 4 11 This
might provide a principled basis for honoring both the fairness and
finality principles.
V. CONCLUSION
The Maryland General Assembly and Maryland's appellate courts
have developed a coherent body of collateral remedies.
The PCPA is the primary remedy.4 12 It has a broad substantive
scope: a petitioner can challenge a conviction or sentence if it is
based, inter alia, on a violation of the federal or state constitutions or
of a law of the state.413 It guarantees first-time petitioners appoint-
ment of counsel (if they are indigent) and a hearing.414 I argue that
the PCPA also authorizes courts to order limited discovery, especially
by deposition, so that the parties can present evidence in forms that
the court believes are "convenient andjust."a15 In addition, the PCPA
has a flexible, fact-sensitive reopening provision ("in the interests of
justice") 416
State habeas corpus complements the PCPA remedy.417 It is an
important means to challenge state actions that a detainee cannot
reach through the PCPA. This includes actions that illegally extend a
period of otherwise valid incarceration (e.g., through errors in calcu-
lating sentences or earned "good conduct time"),418 illegally reimpose
incarceration (e.g., by wrongfully revoking a prisoner's release on
mandatory supervision or parole), or change the rules after a sen-
tence has been imposed (e.g., by retroactively requiring the governor
to approve parole).
411. From my review of the advisory-law instructions in a number of cases, I believe it is
possible to identify: (1) cases in which the advisory-law instructions were categorical, perva-
sive (given repeatedly), and close in time to burden-of-proof, standard-of-proof, privilege-
not-to-testify, and other core instructions (thereby, effectively nullifying those instruc-
tions); (2) cases in which there was a perfunctory advisory-law instruction, which the judge
effectively overrode with categorical and separate burden-of-proof, standard-of-proof, privi-
lege-not-to-testify, and other core instructions; and (3) cases in between these two poles. A
court might find that the first category satisfies the prejudice test and the second does not,
while sorting out the third category on a case-by-case basis.
412. See supra Part III.C.
413. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 7-102 (2004).
414. Id. § 7-108.
415. MD. R. 4-406(c); see supra Part IV.A.
416. CRIM. PROC. § 7-104.
417. See supra Part III.A.
418. "Good conduct time" allows an inmate to deduct a certain amount of his sentence
by exhibiting good conduct. See Woods v. Steiner, 207 F. Supp. 945, 947-48 (D. Md. 1962)
(describing generally how "good conduct" time is awarded).
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In addition, a prisoner can challenge the legality of his conviction
or sentence by habeas corpus, as he can through the PCPA, but there
are powerful disincentives to do so that preserve the central role of
the PCPA.419
A convicted defendant, by motion filed in the original criminal
case, can challenge an illegal sentence at any time.42° In noncapital
cases, a court can grant relief "ordinarily... only where there is some
illegality in the sentence itself or where no sentence should have been
imposed."4 21 However, Maryland's courts have construed this princi-
ple flexibly; e.g., to review a claim that a court erred in imposing a life
sentence that was authorized for the crime, but without realizing it
had discretion to suspend all or part of that sentence, and therefore
without exercising that discretion.422 In capital cases, the scope of the
motion is broader. A petitioner may assert constitutional errors that
"may have contributed to [a] death sentence, at least where the allega-
tion of error is partly based upon a decision of the United States Su-
preme Court or of [the Maryland Court of Appeals] rendered after
the defendant's capital sentencing proceeding. "423
In recent years, Maryland has given some prisoners expanded op-
portunities to assert claims based on newly discovered evidence that
substantially demonstrates that they are innocent, including death-
sentenced prisoners and other prisoners who can demonstrate this
through scientific, especially DNA, evidence.424
If, however, Justice Frankfurter was right that "[t] he history of
American freedom is, in no small measure, the history of proce-
dure," '425 then the assessment of the PCPA is mixed. Its procedural
default provisions, as construed, fairly protect a narrow category of
claims based on "fundamental rights," while providing little protec-
tion to the remainder of claims. In the latter respect, attorneys inad-
vertently "waive" these claims for their unsuspecting clients when they
fail to preserve those claims at trial and on appeal. Their actions and
omissions often are negligent, but fall short of actionable ineffective
assistance of counsel, and sometimes are competent, but not pre-
scient. These comprise the vast majority of attorney errors.426
419. See supra Part III.A.
420. See supra Part III.B.
421. Evans v. State, 382 Md. 248, 278-79, 855 A.2d 219, 309 (2004).
422. State v. Chaney, 375 Md. 168, 825 A.2d 452 (2003).
423. Evans, 382 Md. at 279, 855 A.2d at 309.
424. See supra Part IV.C.2.
425. Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 414 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
426. See supra Part III.C.l.h.
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I make several suggestions about how courts might respond to
these problems by more fully enforcing the current provisions of the
PCPA, including: (1) a provision that authorizes a court to excuse
waiver when a petitioner demonstrates "special circumstances" that
justify excuse; 427 and (2) a provision that authorizes a court to reopen
a postconviction proceeding when it is "in the interests of justice" to
do so.4 2 8 I argue that these provisions authorize postconviction courts
to recognize "freestanding" and "gateway" claims of innocence, 429 as
appellate courts in other states have done, and to excuse an attorney's
failure to preserve a claim based on a subsequent and reasonably un-
foreseeable development in the law.43 °
I offer two case examples in support of my arguments. In the
Michael Austin case, the Circuit Court for Baltimore City accepted
and applied the gateway theory of innocence to reopen prior postcon-
viction proceedings and provide postconviction relief to the peti-
tioner. I argue this decision was correct. 41 In a hypothetical-a
composite based on a number of actual cases-I argue that Mary-
land's courts should excuse the failures of Maryland's lawyers to ob-
ject to the old instruction that juries were judges of the law as well as
of the facts. I explain why I think the "special circumstances" and
"interests of justice" provisions of the PCPA support this
conclusion.43 2
I make my arguments against the background of the retrench-
ment in federal habeas corpus. I believe, quoting Justice O'Connor,
that "the principal benefit of the federalist system is a check on abuses
of government power. ' 43 I believe that if there is "a healthy balance
of power between the States and the Federal Government," it "will
reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front. 43 4
The understanding that state courts can and should act as a
check on the federal courts, and that this role inheres in the federal
separation of powers doctrine, is part of "l[b] oth constitutional history
and theory."43 5 It was state courts, after all, not Chief Justice John
427. See supra Parts III.C.l.h, IV.C.2.
428. See supra Parts IV.B, IV.C.2.
429. See supra Part IV.C.2.a.
430. See supra Part IV.C.2.b.
431. See supra Part IV.C.2.a(2).
432. See supra Part IV.C.2.b.
433. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991).
434. Id.
435. A.E. Dick Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger Court,
62 VA. L. Rav. 873, 935 (1976); see United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 454 (Brennan, J.,
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Marshall, who first developed the doctrine of judicial review.
43 6
Before the Civil War, "antislavery lawyers adopted a forceful states'
rights stance" to challenge the fugitive slave laws.4 3 7 In short, consist-
ently throughout our history, state courts have read their own consti-
tutions to recognize and protect rights in ways that supplement and
occasionally depart from Supreme Court rulings,43 8 and that tradition
continues.
4 3 9
I believe there is no more important time than now, and no more
important area than the collateral process, in which our state courts
can play this vital role.
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